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Means to an End: Electively Forcing Vesting to Suit
Tax Rules Against Perpetuities
James P. Spica*
Editor’s synopsis: Exercising special powers of appointment over tax advantaged trusts in a jurisdiction that has enacted perpetuities reform can
be hazardous in light of the so-called “Delaware tax trap” and the “constructive additions” and trust-modification rules of the Treasury’s GSTtax effective date regulations. Compliance with these federal tax rules
against perpetuities may or may not be guaranteed by the applicable reform legislation. This Article examines a particular situation in which selfhelp is required for compliance, offers a set of forced-vesting provisions
to fit the bill, and indicates how those provisions can be adapted for use in
other situations in which, in light of local perpetuities reform, the exercise
of a special power of appointment threatens the longevity of federal tax
advantages.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Exercising special powers of appointment over tax advantaged
trusts in a jurisdiction that has enacted perpetuities reform can be hazardous in three salient planning situations. One is when a nonfiduciary
special power of appointment (first power) is being exercised to create,
or newly subject property to, another power of appointment (second
power) in a jurisdiction whose perpetuities reform creates a need for,
but does not actually provide, a competent anti-“Delaware tax trap”
provision.1 The risk in that situation (Trap Situation) is that if future
interests created by exercise of the second power will be subject to a
reformed perpetuities regime, the power-spawning (or power-enabling)
exercise of the first power may cause the value of assets subject to the
1 See, e.g., James P. Spica, A Trap for the Wary: Delaware’s Anti-Delaware-TaxTrap Statute Is Too Clever by Half (of Infinity), 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 673
passim (2009). See generally Stephen E. Greer, The Delaware Tax Trap and the Abolition
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 EST. PLAN. 68 (2001).
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second power to be included in the transfer tax base of the holder of the
first power under the so-called “Delaware tax trap.”
Delaware tax trap (Trap) is the colloquial name for Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 2041(a)(3) and its gift tax counterpart, Code
section 2514(d), which provide that assets subject to a power of appointment (first power) are included in the power holder’s (H’s) transfer tax
base (gift tax base or gross estate depending on whether the triggering
exercise is effectively testamentary) to the extent H exercises the power
by creating another power over the assets in question (second power)
that “under the applicable local law can be validly exercised so as to
postpone the vesting of [future interests in the assets], or suspend the
absolute ownership or power of alienation of such [assets], for a period
ascertainable without regard to the date of creation of the first power.”2
If local perpetuities reform will enable the second power (the power
created, or to which property is subjected, by H) to be exercised so as,
for example, to postpone the vesting of future interests in the subject
assets for a period without end, that period will be “ascertainable,” if at
all, “without regard to the date of creation of [H’s] power,”3 and the
Trap will be sprung.4
The second potentially hazardous situation (Grandfathered Assets
Situation) is when a special power of appointment (fiduciary or nonfiduciary) is being exercised over trust assets “grandfathered” from the federal generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax in a jurisdiction whose
perpetuities reform does not expressly exclude such assets. The Treasury’s GST tax effective date regulations generally exempt from GST
tax any “generation-skipping transfer” under a trust that was irrevocable on September 25, 1985 provided the trust is not tampered with in
any of several prohibited ways.5 One mode of tampering the regulations
proscribe involves extension of the time for vesting of future interests in
assets of a grandfathered trust by means of post-GST-tax-effective-date
exercises of fiduciary and nonfiduciary special powers of appointment,6
and for purposes of distinguishing permissible extensions of that kind
from impermissible ones, the regulations impose a rule against perpetu2 See I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (estate tax version of Trap); see also id. § 2514(d) (gift tax
version).
3 Id. § 2041(a)(3).
4 See Spica, supra note 1, at 681; see also Greer, supra note 1, at 72-74. The Trap
Situation is discussed infra Part VI.C.
5 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1). A fuller description of the effective-date exemption would have to refer also to the regulations’ transition rules for wills and revocable trusts executed before October 22, 1986 and for certain cases involving mental
incompetency. See id. § 26.2601-1(b)(2) to (3).
6 See id. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2) (fiduciary special power of appointment); see
also id. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(B)(2) (nonfiduciary power).
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ities of their very own (Regulatory RAP),7 one ostensibly independent
of state law perpetuities rules.
The Regulatory RAP testing period is twenty-one years from the
death of any life in being at the time the grandfathered trust became
irrevocable—or, for purposes of some of the regulations, the time the
grandfathered trust was “created”—(plus gestation),8 though in a nod to
the uniform statutory rule against perpetuities (USRAP), the regulations grant that
the exercise of a power of appointment that validly postpones
or suspends the vesting, absolute ownership or power of alienation of an interest in property for a term of years that will not
exceed 90 years (measured from the date of creation of the
trust [or for purposes of some of the regulations, the date the
trust became irrevocable]) will not be considered an exercise
that postpones or suspends vesting, absolute ownership or
power of alienation beyond the [regulatory] perpetuities
period.9
The effective date regulations expressly acknowledge the transitivity of grandfathered status in certain cases in which a fiduciary or nonfiduciary special power of appointment is used to move assets from a
grandfathered trust to another trust provided exercise of the power does
not make it possible for the vesting, absolute ownership, or power of
alienation of an interest in the trust assets to be postponed or suspended
beyond the Regulatory RAP testing period.10 On the other hand, an
exercise that does make such a postponement or suspension possible
will forfeit grandfathered status.11 The precise effect of that forfeiture is
not spelled out in the effective date regulations, and the Internal Revenue Service (Service) has taken inconsistent positions on the point in
private letter rulings.12 But whatever its precise effect(s) may be, loss of
grandfathered status must make possible a GST tax event that
7 See James P. Spica, A Newly Revised Post Perpetuities Reform RAP Applicability
Flowchart for Property Subject to Michigan Law, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 1347, 1364 (2014).
8 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2).
9 See id. (fiduciary special power of appointment); see also id. § 26.26011(b)(1)(v)(B)(2) (nonfiduciary power); see generally Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax: New Perils for Practitioners and
New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 185, 189-90 (1995).
10 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A) (fiduciary special power of appointment), described infra in the text accompanying note 57.
11 See supra note 9.
12 See William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview
and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 22
(2010).
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grandfathered status would have precluded.13 So, the risk in the
Grandfathered Assets Situation is that owing to perpetuities reform, the
exercise of a fiduciary or nonfiduciary special power of appointment to
move assets of a grandfathered trust to another trust will bring it about
that the vesting of future interests in, or absolute ownership of, those
assets may be postponed or suspended beyond the Regulatory RAP
testing period and will thereby forfeit grandfathered status.14
The third potentially hazardous situation (GST Exemption Situation) is when the holder of a fiduciary or nonfiduciary special power of
appointment wants to play safe with assets of a pre-perpetuities-reform
trust to which “GST exemption”15 has been allocated in a jurisdiction in
which, apart from any exclusion for GST tax grandfathered assets, it is
possible to appoint into the reformed perpetuities regime.16 Now, the
effective date regulations say nothing about the GST exemption;17 the
Regulatory RAP has literally nothing to do with trusts having a zero
“inclusion ratio,”18 for GST tax purposes, because of an allocation of
GST exemption.19 But the Service regularly rules in private letter rulings that there is no threat to GST-exemption-sheltered status in circumstances in which there would be no threat to GST-tax-grandfathered
status.20
So, the risk in the GST Exemption Situation is that owing to perpetuities reform, the exercise of a fiduciary or nonfiduciary special power
of appointment over GST-exemption-sheltered assets will bring it about
that the vesting, absolute ownership, or power of alienation of an interest in the assets may be postponed or suspended beyond the Regulatory
RAP testing period, thereby taking the case out of a safe harbor the
13 See I.R.C. §§ 2611 (“generation-skipping transfer” defined for GST tax purposes), 2612 (“taxable termination” and “taxable distribution” defined); see also Treas.
Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i) (effect of grandfathered status).
14 See Greer, supra note 1, at 73. Cf. James P. Spica, Spilt to Last: Longevity Planning for Tax Advantaged Trusts under a New Statutory Decanting Regime in Michigan, 48
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 35, 67 (2013) (“grandfathered” status of “special appointee
trusts” expressly protected under Michigan Personal Property Trust Perpetuities Act of
2008). The Grandfathered Assets Situation is discussed infra Part VI.B.
15 I.e., a trust that is not generally exempted from GST tax by the effective date
regulations (see supra note 5 and accompanying text), but one whose assets (or some of
whose assets) are sheltered by the limited exemption from that tax described in I.R.C.
§ 2631.
16 See, e.g., the provisions of Michigan law described infra in the text accompanying
notes 34-48.
17 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1), (b)(4) (as amended in 2004); see also I.R.C.
§ 2631.
18 I.e., the ratio described in I.R.C. § 2642(a).
19 See, e.g., Culp & Mellen, supra note 12, at 23.
20 See, e.g., PLR 200743028 (May 29, 2007); PLR 200919008 (Jan. 12, 2009).
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Service seems to have invented and bruited about for preserving the
efficacy of prior allocations of GST exemption.
There is a sense in which the third of these planning situations, the
GST Exemption Situation, is more general than either of the other two.
The Trap Situation, for example, may implicate the Grandfathered Assets Situation or the GST Exemption Situation, but it may not: it may be
that the assets subject to the nonfiduciary special power of appointment
in question are neither grandfathered from GST tax nor GST-exemption sheltered. The Grandfathered Assets Situation, on the other hand,
implicates the Trap Situation whenever the special power in question is
a nonfiduciary power21 whose exercise will create (or newly subject
property to) one or more other powers of appointment. But the
Grandfathered Assets Situation never implicates the GST Exemption
Situation: while a grandfathered trust is grandfathered, its assets cannot
be GST-exemption sheltered because the GST exemption is a provision
of the Code22 that simply does not apply to a trust grandfathered from
GST tax.23
But the GST Exemption Situation not only implicates the Trap Situation whenever the special power in question is a nonfiduciary power
whose exercise will create (or newly subject property to) other powers
of appointment, it also analytically depends—by way of make-believe—
on the Grandfathered Assets Situation, for “playing safe” with GSTexemption-sheltered assets is simply a matter of pretending that those
assets are grandfathered from GST tax and then being careful not to
forfeit that (imagined) status when exercising the special power in question. So, someone in either a Grandfathered Assets Situation or a GST
Exemption Situation may or may not thereby be interested in the Trap
Situation; but whereas no one in a Grandfathered Assets Situation is
thereby interested in the GST Exemption Situation, everyone in a GST
Exemption Situation is thereby interested in the Grandfathered Assets
Situation.
The point of this Article is to present and elucidate a set of forcedvesting provisions that can be used by a power holder to disarm the
relevant risk(s) in each of the potentially hazardous situations described
above. The relative generality of the GST Exemption Situation suggests
the following plan of exposition. For exemplification, Part II of the Article describes a hypothetical GST Exemption Situation involving a fiduciary special power of appointment. The hypothetical trustee’s
motivation to force vesting in the exemplified situation is examined in
21 Legislative history indicates that the Trap was not intended to apply to exercises
of purely fiduciary powers of appointment. See infra text accompanying note 156.
22 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(i) (effect of grandfathered status).
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Part III. Suitable forced-vesting provisions are then presented in Part IV
and explicated in Part V. Finally, in Part VI, the forced-vesting provisions are adapted for use in GST Exemption Situations involving nonfiduciary special powers, Grandfathered Assets Situations, and Trap
Situations. Along the way, we shall encounter two tangential matters
that we can conveniently relegate to appendices: one concerning “qualified severance”24 and one concerning a highly technical aspect of the
Trap.25
II. A CASE

IN

POINT—TRUSTEE

IN A

GST EXEMPTION SITUATION

On his death, by virtue of his having had a testamentary general
power of appointment, a trust beneficiary named Junior became the
“transferor,” for GST tax purposes, of the assets of a separate discretionary trust established primarily for his benefit under the 2007 “Children’s Trust” created by a settlor named Senior.26 Junior’s failure to
exercise his testamentary general power caused the assets of Junior’s
separate trust to be distributed, pursuant to default-of-appointment provisions, to another separate discretionary trust (Sibling Trust) currently
being administered under the Children’s Trust instrument primarily for
the benefit of Junior’s sibling, Sibling.27 Because Sibling’s general power
of appointment over the Sibling Trust is testamentary and the present
beneficiaries of the Sibling Trust potentially include people (descendants of Sibling) who are “skip persons” with respect to Junior, the default disposition will have drawn an automatic allocation of Junior’s
GST exemption at the time of Junior’s death.28
Thus, after Junior’s death, the Sibling Trust included a portion of
assets (Exempt Portion) protected from GST tax by an allocation of
Junior’s GST exemption. For GST tax purposes, the Exempt Portion
was part of a separate trust within the Sibling Trust, a separate trust
24 I.e., the GST tax trust-division facility described in Treasury Regulation section
26.2642-6. See infra Appendix A.
25 See infra Appendix B.
26 See I.R.C. §§ 2041 (assets subject to general powers of appointment includable in
power holder’s gross estate), 2652(a)(1)(A) (in case of property includable in gross estate, “transferor” means decedent).
27 We may suppose that all separate trusts described in the Children’s Trust instrument are governed by the same provisions and that (in each case) the trustee is authorized to pay to or for the benefit of the primary beneficiary or his or her descendants so
much (whether some, none, or all) of the net income or principal of the trust as the
trustee determines, in her sole discretion, to be in the best interests of those beneficiaries.
28 See I.R.C. §§ 2631(a) (individual’s GST exemption may be allocated to any property with respect to which individual is transferor), 2632 (available GST exemption automatically allocated to transfers in trust for the benefit of “skip persons”); see also Treas.
Reg. § 26.2632-1(d)(2) (automatic allocation of GST exemption after death).
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comprising the value of the assets of which Junior had become the GST
tax transferor (Junior Portion)—the value, that is, that was added to the
Sibling Trust from Junior’s separate trust on account of Junior’s death.29
Therefore, when the Junior Portion was later divided from the Sibling
Trust (pursuant to state law)30 to form a separate “Junior Transferor
Trust,” the entire Exempt Portion of the Sibling Trust was lodged in the
resulting Transferor Trust.
It is now proposed that at least the Exempt Portion of the Junior
Transferor Trust should be “decanted”31 into a new discretionary trust
for the benefit of Senior’s grandchildren (and remoter descendants) in
Sibling’s line of the family. (It is presumably part of the trustee’s motivation that this should avert the Exempt Portion’s inclusion in Sibling’s
estate tax base by removing that Portion from the sway of Sibling’s testamentary general power of appointment.32) The separate trust for Junior’s benefit and the Sibling Trust were both initially funded at the
Children’s Trust’s inception; at its inception, the Children’s Trust was
irrevocable; and from inception to date, the Children’s Trust has been
governed (as to validity, effect, and administration) by Michigan law.
The Sibling Trust terminates on Senior’s death.33
III. THE TRUSTEE’S DECISION

TO

PLAY SAFE

Applicability of Michigan’s most recent perpetuities reform is a
function of (1) the vintages of trusts subject to Michigan law and (2) the
type of property held in trust:34 except for certain personal property
previously held in trusts grandfathered from GST tax, Michigan’s Per29

See Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(a)(2).
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7417(1) (2015) (division facility requiring resulting trusts with “substantially identical terms” based on UNIF. TRUST CODE § 417,
(2010)).
31 I.e., that the Exempt Portion should be distributed by the trustee of the Transferor Trust in further trust for the benefit of permissible distributees of the trustee’s discretionary distribution power. See Spica, supra note 14, at 39-42; Culp & Mellen, supra
note 12, at 3-7.
32 See I.R.C. § 2041 (assets subject to general powers of appointment includable in
power holder’s gross estate). We know Sibling has a testamentary general power of appointment over the assets of the Junior Transferor Trust because we know (1) that the
Transferor Trust has the same terms as the Sibling Trust, see supra note 30 and accompanying text; (2) that Junior had a testamentary general power over the assets of his separate trust, see supra text accompanying note 26; and (3) that all separate trusts described
in the Children’s Trust instrument are governed by the same provisions, see supra
note 27).
33 We may suppose that the Children’s Trust instrument does not grant Sibling or
anyone else a nonfiduciary special power of appointment that provides an alternative
means of achieving the trustee’s decanting objectives.
34 See generally Spica, supra note 7, at 1372-73.
30
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sonal Property Trust Perpetuities Act of 2008 (PPTPA) applies to interests in (and powers of appointment over) personal property held in any
trust that was revocable on or created after May 28, 2008;35 and like
Delaware’s, Michigan’s general exemption from the rule against perpetuities (RAP) (and similar rules affecting the duration of trusts) does
not pertain to real property, regardless of whether such property is held
in trust.36 Thus, excepting certain property previously held in trusts
grandfathered from GST tax, the vesting of a future interest in personal
property held in a Michigan trust created after May 28, 2008 can be
postponed indefinitely under PPTPA (unless the interest was created by
the exercise of a special power appointment (second power) that was
itself created by a nonfiduciary special power of appointment (first
power), in which case PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision requires the interest
to vest within 360 years from the creation of the first power).37
Now, under Michigan law, a trust distribution in trust—that is, decanting—is viewed, not as a continuation of the distributing trust, but as
a distribution from one trust to another.38 Hence the distribution trust
that results from the proposed decanting of the Junior Transferor Trust
(Distribution Trust) will be viewed as a new trust created as of the time
of decanting. Since (given the date of this Article) that decanting is
bound to occur after May 28, 2008, PPTPA is bound to apply to future
interests in the Distribution Trust’s personal property.39 So, to the extent the Junior Transferor Trust holds personal property, decanting into
the Distribution Trust raises the prospect of extending—considerably or
indefinitely, depending on whether the Children’s Trust was or was not
created by the exercise of a nonfiduciary special power of appointment—the period during which the vesting of future interests in the decanted assets can be postponed.
That raises the question whether, in order to protect the Exempt
Portion’s zero inclusion ratio for GST tax purposes, the terms of the
Distribution Trust should force future interests in the Exempt Portion
(at least) to vest within the relatively short perpetuities testing period
prescribed in the GST tax effective date regulations for the Regulatory
RAP. If so, the motivation is not that the effective date regulations say
anything about decanting’s effect on prior allocations of GST exemption: again, those regulations say nothing whatever about the GST ex35
36

See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.94.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.93, 554.94

(2015).
37

See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.92, 554.93.
See id. § 556.115a(1) (codifying common law decanting power as a power to distribute assets from one trust to another).
39 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
38
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emption.40 The motivation is only that, again, the Service regularly
affects not to have noticed that the effective date regulations say nothing
whatever about the GST exemption—that the Service regularly rules
that there is no threat to GST-exemption-sheltered status in circumstances in which there would be no threat to GST-tax-grandfathered
status.41
The proposed decanting also poses a tactical question tangential to
forced vesting, viz., whether in order to constitute a qualified severance42 (yielding a separate trust with a GST tax inclusion ratio43 of
zero), a severance of the Exempt Portion (currently lodged in the Junior
Transferor Trust) must either precede, rather than follow, or follow,
rather than precede, the proposed decanting. This question is too vexed
to be handily dispatched, too important to be ignored, and too much of
a tangent conveniently to be taken up here apropos of the trustee’s decision to force (or not to force) vesting. It will therefore be expedient to
relegate the question (of sequence for severance and decanting) to an
Appendix44 and to proceed (in what remains of this Part of the Article)
with our examination of the trustee’s motivation, such as it is, to force
the vesting of future interests in the Exempt Portion.
A. The Regulatory RAP and Its Hypothetical Relevance to Zero
Inclusion Ratio Trusts
The considerations noted thus far are these: (1) the Treasury’s GST
tax effective date regulations generally exempt from GST tax any generation-skipping transfer under a trust that was irrevocable on September
25, 1985;45 (2) the regulations acknowledge the transitivity of such a
trust’s grandfathered status in certain circumstances in which the trust’s
assets are moved to a different trust by means of a fiduciary or nonfiduciary special power of appointment provided exercise of the power does
not make it possible for the vesting, absolute ownership, or power of
alienation of an interest in the trust assets to be postponed or suspended
beyond the Regulatory RAP testing period;46 (3) the regulations provide, however, that grandfathered status is forfeit if the exercise of such
a power does make such a postponement or suspension possible;47 (4)
the Children’s Trust, let alone the Junior Transferor Trust, was not irrev40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
supra note 24.
supra note 18.
infra Appendix A.
supra note 5.
supra note 10.
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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ocable on September 25, 1985 and is not otherwise described in the provisions of the effective date regulations; (5) the effective date
regulations have literally nothing to do with the GST exemption or zeroinclusion-ratio trusts;48 but (6) the Service regularly rules in private letter rulings that there is no threat to GST-exemption-sheltered status in
circumstances in which there would be no threat to GST-taxgrandfathered status.49
Now, to infer a prohibition from that rulings practice of the Service
(consideration (6) above) is illogical. It is a patent example of the logical
fallacy of “denying the antecedent”50 to argue that because there is no
threat to GST-exemption-sheltered status in circumstances in which
there would be no threat to GST-tax-grandfathered status (assuming
this is true), there is a threat to GST-exemption-sheltered status in circumstances in which there would be a threat to GST-tax-grandfathered
status. (One might as well deduce that X is not carrying an umbrella
from the premises (1) that when it rains, X carries an umbrella and (2) it
is not raining. The deduction is invalid because premise (1) says absolutely nothing about the situation described by premise (2)—it may be
that X just always carries an umbrella!) As a matter of logic, the Service’s penchant for adverting to the effective date regulations apropos of
situations to which they do not apply lends no credence whatever to the
idea that the Regulatory RAP constrains exercises of special powers of
appointment over assets to which GST exemption has been allocated.
The Treasury did once propose to apply the Regulatory RAP in just
that way, as a constraint on exercises of nonfiduciary special powers of
appointment. Before the adoption of the final GST tax regulations, the
proposed regulations under Code section 2652 (on the definition of the
term ‘transferor’ for GST tax purposes) provided:
The exercise of a power of appointment that is not a general
power of appointment (as defined in section 2041(b)) is treated
as a transfer subject to Federal estate or gift tax by the holder
of the power if the power is exercised in a manner that may
postpone or suspend the vesting, absolute ownership, or power
of alienation of an interest in property for a period, measured
from the date of creation of the trust, extending beyond any
specified life in being at the date of creation of the trust plus a
period of 21 years plus, if necessary, a reasonable period of
gestation (perpetuities period). For purposes of this paragraph
(a)(4), the exercise of a power of appointment that validly
48

See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20.
50 See, e.g., RICHARD JEFFREY, FORMAL LOGIC: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS 65-66 (2d ed.
1981); WESLEY C. SALMON, LOGIC 29 (3d ed. 1984).
49
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postpones or suspends the vesting, absolute ownership or
power of alienation of an interest in property for a term of
years that will not exceed 90 years (measured from the date of
creation of the trust) is not an exercise that may extend beyond
the perpetuities period.51
But a subsequent amendment to the proposed regulations deleted this
provision,52 leaving no trace of the Treasury’s faint-hearted attempt to
extend the prohibitive force of the Regulatory RAP beyond the effective date provisions. The upshot is that there is currently no GST tax
prohibition, in the effective date regulations or elsewhere, against extending—by decanting or, for that matter, the exercise of any special
power of appointment—the period during which future interests in
GST-exemption-sheltered assets can be postponed.53
But if a prohibition cannot be inferred from the Service’s rulings
practice, perhaps a safe harbor can. The trustee’s best reason for affecting to “comply” with the Regulatory RAP as if it applied to the Exempt
Portion is, perhaps, that the effect of decanting on trusts having a zero
inclusion ratio is a “no-ruling” area “under study” by the Service.54 As a
practical matter, this means that for the immediate future, the only positive guidance to be found is in the rulings described above in which the
Service has said that there is no threat to GST-exemption-sheltered status in circumstances in which there would be no threat to GST-taxgrandfathered status.55 “Complying” with the Regulatory RAP (assuming it is possible on our facts) will allow the trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust to point to the Service’s rulings practice as positive authority
(such as it is) for—as opposed to “pointing” to a lack of any authority
51 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1(a)(4); 61 Fed. Reg. 29654 (proposed June 12, 1996)
(subsequently amended by T.D. 8720, 1997-1 C.B. 187). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 26.26011(b)(1)(v)(B), -1(b)(4)(i)(A).
52 Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1.
53 See Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., An Analysis of the Tax Effects of Decanting, 47
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 141, 169-70 (2012); Culp & Mellen, supra note 12, at 25;
CAROL A. HARRINGTON ET AL., GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX: ANALYSIS WITH
FORMS ¶ 2.02(1)(d) (2d ed. 2001). The Treasury has lately proposed a limit for the useful
life of an allocated GST exemption by means of legislation under which property could
be GST exemption sheltered only for ninety years from the date the GST exemption is
allocated. See Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal
Year 2013 Revenue Proposals 81-82 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf; see also Dep’t of the Treasury,
General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals 129-30
(2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explana
tions-FY2012.pdf (same proposal).
54 See Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 I.R.B. 113, § 5.01(24).
55 See supra note 20.

Fall/Winter 2014]

MEANS TO AN END

359

against—the proposition that the Exempt Portion’s zero inclusion ratio
should survive decanting.
It is therefore relevant to our story that if the Sibling Trust were a
grandfathered trust, then under the effective date regulations, (1) the
assets of the Junior Transferor Trust would still be grandfathered and (2)
the proposed decanting of the Transferor Trust could be carried out so
that the assets of the Distribution Trust would also continue to be
grandfathered. (Otherwise, it would simply not be available to the trustee to “comply” with the Regulatory RAP, even if she considers the
Service’s rulings practice sufficient motivation to try.)
B. Decanting under the Effective Date Regulations
The GST tax effective date regulations explicitly permit the use of a
fiduciary special power of appointment to distribute assets from one
trust to another (that is, decanting) without loss of grandfathered status,
provided the exercise does not (1) shift a beneficial interest in the trust
assets to a younger generation of beneficiaries or (2) “extend the time
for vesting of any beneficial interest in the trust beyond the period provided for in the original trust.”56 The regulations also provide an alternative safe harbor for the exercise of a fiduciary special power of
appointment in case (1) the time for vesting of future interests in the
trust assets is not extended beyond the Regulatory RAP testing period
measured from the time the grandfathered trust became irrevocable and
(2) the terms of the grandfathered trust or state law “at the time the
[grandfathered] trust became irrevocable . . . authorized the distribution
to a new trust . . . without the consent or approval of any beneficiary or
court.”57
The first of the decanting safe harbors just described (No-Shift-NoStretch Safe Harbor) does not depend on the vintage of the trustee’s
decanting power, but it does depend on the continuity of the period for
vesting: the No-Shift-No-Stretch Safe Harbor cannot be used to extend
the time for the vesting of future interests beyond the period provided
in the original grandfathered trust, even if that period is shorter than the
Regulatory RAP would allow. On the other hand, the second of the
regulations’ safe harbors (Vintage-Power Safe Harbor) can be used to
extend the period for vesting, within the limits prescribed by the Regulatory RAP, but the Vintage-Power Safe Harbor is only available if the
trustee’s decanting authority is as old as the original grandfathered
trust’s irrevocability.
56
57

See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D) (emphasis added).
Id. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A) (emphasis added).
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Now, if the Children’s Trust were a grandfathered trust, the division
of the Sibling Trust that yielded the Junior Transferor Trust would be
within the No-Shift-No-Stretch Safe Harbor, for the terms of the Junior
Transferor Trust are identical with those of the Sibling Trust: we know
that neither beneficial interests nor the period for vesting of future interests was changed as a result of the division, because nothing was
changed other than the number of separate trusts recognized under
state law.58 So, if the Children’s Trust were a grandfathered trust, then
under the effective date regulations, the assets of the Junior Transferor
Trust would still be grandfathered, thanks to the No-Shift-No-Stretch
Safe Harbor.
But the prospective decanting into the Distribution Trust cannot be
done in the same way, with the same degree of hypothesized safety
under the effective date regulations, for the decanting is intended to
shift beneficial interests away from the current beneficiary of Junior’s
generation (viz., Sibling) to the younger generation of Junior’s nieces
and nephews. It is true that Sibling might be named as a permissible
distributee of the Distribution Trust, but the confluence of the basic dispositive objective and the presumptive goal of avoiding inclusion of the
Distribution Trust’s assets in Sibling’s gross estate59 entails that the testamentary general power of appointment Sibling now has under the Junior Transferor Trust60 will at least be cut down, in the Distribution Trust,
to a special power exercisable in favor of Sibling’s descendants.
The following analysis will show, however, that the prospective decanting into the Distribution Trust can be brought within the VintagePower Safe Harbor. And that raises the question whether the terms of
the Distribution Trust should “protectively” force future interests in the
Exempt Portion (at least) to vest within the Regulatory RAP testing
period—in light of the Service’s penchant for suggesting in private letter
rulings that what is said in the effective date regulations about
grandfathered trusts may pertain protectively to a trust having a zero
inclusion ratio.61 For, again, without special provisions to govern the Exempt Portion, the period during which the vesting of future interests in
that Portion may be postponed after decanting will be infinite under
PPTPA (unless the Children’s Trust was created by the exercise of a
nonfiduciary special power of appointment, in which case, under
PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision, the period would be 360 years from the

58
59
60
61

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

note 30.
text accompanying notes 31-32.
note 32.
note 20 and accompanying text.
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date the special power was created—a pale vastly beyond that of the
Regulatory RAP).62
C. Decanting Michigan Trusts in the Vintage-Power Safe Harbor
There is explicit authority in section 5a of the Michigan Powers of
Appointment Act for the decanting that will yield the Distribution
Trust.63 But section 5a was added to the amended Act in 2012, and 2012
is too recent a vintage for purposes of the Vintage-Power Safe Harbor:
again, that safe harbor requires that the terms of the grandfathered trust
or state law “at the time the [grandfathered] trust became irrevocable . . .
authorized the distribution to a new trust.”64 So, the argument we want
to make here depends on the plausibility of a claim about the common
law. The argument is that if the Children’s Trust were a grandfathered
trust, and if decanting of the Transferor Trust did not allow the vesting
of future interests in the Exempt Portion to be postponed beyond the
Regulatory RAP testing period, then under the effective date regulations’ Vintage-Power Safe Harbor, the assets of the Exempt Portion of
the Distribution Trust could continue to be grandfathered. And the
claim is that given the terms of the Children’s Trust, the common law in
effect in Michigan when that Trust became irrevocable authorized the
trustee to decant.
Of course, the Children’s Trust instrument could explicitly authorize decanting: it might expressly provide that the trustee’s discretionary
power to make distributions pursuant to the trust instrument is a fiduciary special power of appointment that includes the power to make distributions in trust and to create powers of appointment. In that case, the
trustee has all the facility she needs for her purpose.65 On the other
hand, the trust instrument could explicitly forbid decanting, in which
case, decanting is simply not on.66
62 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. Apropos of PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision (mentioned parenthetically in the text), consider that if, for example, the Children’s Trust was created by the exercise of a nonfiduciary special power of appointment
that could be “related back” to the beginning of the American civil war, the anti-Trap
provision would allow the vesting of future interests in the Exempt Portion to be postponed until the year 2,221, 206 years hence. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. See
also infra note 172 (“relation-back” doctrine).
63 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.115a (2015) (added to Michigan Powers of Appointment Act of 1967 by Act effective Dec. 28, 2012, Act. No. 485, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 217).
64 See supra note 57.
65 See, e.g., In re Estate of Resiman, 702 N.W.2d 658, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)
(discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 70-71).
66 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 556.112(c) (defining “power of appointment” as
“a power . . . that enables the donee of the power to designate, within any limits that may
be prescribed, the transferees of the property [subject to the power]”), 556.115(2) (requiring that an exercise comply “with the requirements, if any, of the creating instrument
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We must suppose, therefore, that the Children’s Trust instrument
does not explicitly forbid decanting. But we need not suppose that the
instrument explicitly authorizes it, for (1) a purely discretionary fiduciary power of distribution (like the one described in the Children’s Trust
instrument)67 is a special power of appointment,68 and (2) the Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers (Restatement (Second))
and Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers both support the proposition that, as a special power of appointment, a trustee’s power to make discretionary distributions entails the
power to make distributions in trust for permissible distributees, unless
the trust instrument that created the discretionary power manifests a
contrary intent.69
There is (as far as this author knows) no decided case binding as
precedent on Michigan judges that stands for the Restatements’ proposition that a discretionary power to distribute trust property presumptively implies the power to decant. In Paine v. Kaufman,70 the Michigan
Court of Appeals adduced the relevant foundational provisions of the
Restatement (Second), but the case before the court involved a nonfiduciary power, and the instrument creating the power expressly authorized
appointment in trust.71
Still, the mere absence of binding case authority in a jurisdiction
cannot establish the absence of a common law basis for decanting there,
since the method of common law adjudication obviously cannot be de-

as to the manner, time, and conditions of the exercise of the power”); Hannan v. Slush, 5
F.2d 718, 722 (E.D. Mich. 1925) (requiring that power of appointment be exercised in the
mode prescribed by donor).
67 See supra note 27.
68 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.112(c), (i); see also, e.g., id. § 556.118(2) (stating
that a special power of appointment exercisable by a trustee is presumptively
nonreleasable). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.1 cmt. g (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 11.1 cmt. d (1986); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 591 (7th ed. 2005); J. E. PENNER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS ¶¶ 3.16-3.17 (8th ed. 2012);
SIMON GARDNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 153-55 (3d ed. 2011); W.
Bryan Bolich, The Power of Appointment: Tool of Estate Planning and Drafting, 32
DUKE L.J. 32, 35, 61-62 (1964).
69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 19.14; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 19.3 cmt. a illus. 2,
19.4.
70 In re Estate of Resiman, 702 N.W.2d 658 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
71 See id. at 664.
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duced from the doctrine of precedent alone.72 The Phipps case,73 for
example, a Florida case that strongly supports the Restatements’ view,
was not wrongly decided by the Florida Supreme Court just because, at
the time of decision, there was no Phipps case for the court to rely upon:
reasoning by analogy and the use of nonbinding precedent are potent
forces in the development of common law wherever it exists.74 Thus, the
fact that there is no decided case binding as precedent on Ohio judges
that clearly stands for the proposition that a discretionary power to distribute trust assets presumptively implies the power to decant75 did not
prevent the Ohio legislature from asserting that its decanting statute is
partly declarative of common law applicable before the statute’s
enactment.76
Indeed, the portion of the 2012 Michigan decanting legislation that
amended Michigan’s Powers of Appointment Act expressly purports to
be declarative of Michigan common law.77 That statutory declaration (of
legislative intent to codify) directly supports an argument apropos of
trusts grandfathered from GST tax that would likely be made, in any
case, pursuant to the nonpreemption provision of section 5a(7) of the
amended Act—according to which the decanting power the Act newly
describes does not abridge the right of any trustee who has a power to
distribute trust property in further trust under the common law.78 In this
case, that argument is—or would be if the Children’s Trust were a
72 See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 206; 4 Burr. 2303, 2312 (1769) (bases
for “common law without precedent”); Mirehouse v. Rennell, 6 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1023; 1
Cl. & Fin. 527, 546 (1833) (reasoning by analogy in application of “rules of law [derived]
form legal principles and judicial precedents”).
73 Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co., 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940). In Phipps, the Supreme
Court of Florida held that a trustee’s “sole absolute discretion” to direct trust distributions for the benefit of one or more of the settlor’s descendants permitted distributions in
trust, because (the court said) a fiduciary power to transfer a fee simple interest in trust
assets (that is, to make outright distributions) includes the power to create any lesser
estate unless the trust instrument clearly expresses a contrary intent. See id. at 300. Iowa
has similar authority. See In re Estate of Spencer, 232 N.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Iowa 1975). So
has Georgia. See Regents of the Univ. Sys. v. Trust Co. of Ga., 198 S.E. 345 (Ga. 1938).
And so has Massachusetts. See Morse v. Kraft, No. SJC-11233, 2013 Mass. LEXIS 629
(Mass. July 29, 2013).
74 See, e.g., RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 21-24 (2d ed. 1968); NEIL
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 120-21, 155-56 (1979).
75 See William J. McGraw, III, Report of the Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law
Section to the Ohio State Bar Association Council of Delegates 66-67, available at https://
www.ohiobar.org/General%20Resources/pubs/councilfiles/EstPlanComReport.pdf (explaining a proposal to enact section 5808.18 of the Ohio Trust Code authorizing
decanting).
76 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18(O)(1) (LexisNexis 2015).
77 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.115a(8) (2015).
78 See id. § 556.115a(7).
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grandfathered trust—that given the terms of the Children’s Trust, Michigan common law at the time the Children’s Trust became irrevocable
authorized the trustee to make distributions in trust for the benefit of
permissible distributees.
On that argument, if the Children’s Trust were a grandfathered
trust, and if decanting the Exempt Portion of the Junior Transferor Trust
did not allow the vesting of future interests in that Portion to be postponed beyond the Regulatory RAP testing period, then under the effective date regulations, the assets of the Exempt Portion could continue to
be grandfathered within the Distribution Trust. Thus, provided she
forces future interests in the Exempt Portion to vest within the Regulatory RAP testing period, the trustee can decant the Exempt Portion of
the Junior Transferor Trust into the Distribution Trust as if within the
Vintage-Power Safe Harbor.79 And that means the trustee can elect to
come within the safe harbor for GST-exemption-sheltered assets that is
implied in the Service’s practice of ruling that there is no threat to GSTexemption-sheltered status in circumstances in which there would be no
threat to GST-tax-grandfathered status.80
D. Trust Longevity Planning under the Regulatory RAP
The trustee’s decision (if she makes it) to play safe with the Exempt
Portion—by forcing future interests in that Portion to vest within the
Regulatory RAP testing period—does not utterly foreclose trust longevity planning. Though the effective date regulations preclude a tax-advantaged perpetuity for grandfathered assets subject to Michigan law,
by imposing the Regulatory RAP regardless of Michigan law, the Regulatory RAP authorizes a ninety-year testing period or, alternatively, one
measured by “any life in being at the date the original trust became
irrevocable plus . . . 21 years.”81 And as to the latter alternative, the
regulations adopt the common law conception of the equivalence of
lives potentially affecting vesting by expressly permitting the use of extraneous measuring lives.82
Thus, for example, if future interests in the Exempt Portion of the
Distribution Trust are forced to vest within twenty-one years from the
death of the survivor of Junior’s nieces and nephews—or, indeed, the
survivor of a set of younger persons, whether related or wholly unrelated to Senior—who were living at the time the Children’s Trust be79

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20.
81 Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2) (emphasis added).
82 See id. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(D) ex. 4. As to the common law conception, see Jesse
Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1654 n.14,
1660-63 (1985).
80
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came irrevocable, decanting likely will have caused the period during
which vesting can be postponed to be extended, since by its terms, the
Junior Transferor Trust is set to terminate on Senior’s death,83 and it will
have done that without violating the Regulatory RAP.
But, again, that extension of the period for vesting is quite limited
compared to the extension that would otherwise result from decanting,
for (again) the period during which the vesting of future interests in the
Transferor Trust’s assets may be postponed after decanting would be
infinite under PPTPA (or as much as 352 years in case the Children’s
Trust was created by the exercise of a nonfiduciary special power of appointment).84 So, the trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust must carefully evaluate her motivation to play safe by affecting to “comply” with
the Regulatory RAP as if it applied to the Exempt Portion—the very
Portion of the Distribution Trust that, other things being equal, the beneficiaries (with a view to tax efficiency) might wish to have remain in
trust the longest.
IV. FORCED-VESTING PROVISIONS
If the trustee decides “protectively” to force future interests in the
Exempt Portion to vest within the relatively short perpetuities testing
period described in the GST tax effective date regulations, she may do
so by means of the following special provisions.
1.3 This Declaration [that is, the declaration of the Distribution Trust] is intended to ensure, among other things, that
the vesting and exercise requirements of Treasury regulation
section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2) (“Regulatory RAP”) are observed as fully as would be necessary to preserve the Trust assets’ exemption from federal generation-skipping transfer tax if
(contrary to fact) the Children’s Trust had been irrevocable on
September 25, 1985. Though the settlor [of the Distribution
Trust, viz., the trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust] believes
the Regulatory RAP literally does not apply to the assets of
the Children’s Trust, she intends, nevertheless, that regardless
of state law perpetuities rules, all interests in the Distribution
Trust and all powers of appointment over the Distribution
Trust’s assets shall be so constrained by the provisions of this
Declaration as fully—if also unnecessarily—to comply with the
vesting and exercise requirements of the Regulatory RAP.
*
83
84

*

*

See supra note 27 and text accompanying note 33.
See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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[Heading:] Article V - Ultimate Time for Vesting of Beneficial Interests in Trusts Administered under the Provisions
of This Declaration
5.1 Regardless of state law perpetuities rules, every beneficial interest in the assets of every Trust administered under
the provisions of this Declaration shall be indefeasibly vested
no later than the “Ultimate Date,” which shall be the day immediately preceding the twenty-first anniversary of the death
of the last survivor of the persons listed on Schedule B who
were living on [the date the Children’s Trust became
irrevocable].
5.2 On the Ultimate Date, the trustee [of the Distribution Trust (“Trustee”)] shall distribute to the Primary Beneficiary of each Trust85 still being administered under the
provisions of this Declaration (as of the Ultimate Date) all assets of the Trust in question that are not then (on the Ultimate
Date) subject either to a vested interest in someone other than
the Primary Beneficiary or to a presently exercisable general
power of appointment (in anyone).
5.3 If assets of a Trust still being administered under the
provisions of this Declaration as of the Ultimate Date are subject to a vested interest in someone other than the Trust’s Primary Beneficiary, then on the Ultimate Date, by operation of
this Section [5.3], all interests in those assets that are neither
vested nor subject to a presently exercisable general power of
appointment (in anyone) shall vest in the Primary Beneficiary,
and any class subject to open shall close. When the last vested
interest prior to the remotest vested remainder terminates,
Trustee shall distribute to the holder of the remotest vested
remainder, or his or her estate, all of the assets in question that
are not then subject to a presently exercisable general power of
appointment (in anyone).
5.4 The “Penultimate Date” shall be the day immediately preceding the Ultimate Date. On the Penultimate Date,
by operation of this Section [5.4], every testamentary general
power of appointment, every nontestamentary general power
subject to an unsatisfied condition precedent, and every special
power of appointment, over any asset(s) of a Trust still being
administered under the provisions of this Declaration (as of
the Penultimate Date), including Trustee’s discretionary power
85 I.e., the person for whom, and for whose descendants, the separate discretionary
trust in question was established pursuant to the Distribution Trust declaration.
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to make distributions, shall lapse. These effects shall all be
deemed to occur, simultaneously, in the last discernable moment of the Penultimate Date’s duration.
5.5 For purposes of this Article [V] and of Article VI, a
distinct trust under terms that differ in any way from those of
this Declaration (“Outside Trust”) to which Trust assets are
transferred by the exercise of a power of appointment, including Trustee’s discretionary power to make distributions, is not a
“Trust administered under the provisions of this Declaration,”
even if some of the provisions of this Declaration are incorporated in the Outside Trust’s governing instrument.
[Heading:] Article VI - Ultimate Time for Exercise of,
and for Vesting of Future Interests Created by Exercise of,
Certain Powers of Appointment
6.1 A “Subject Power” is any power of appointment, including Trustee’s discretionary power to make distributions,
that is expressly created by this Declaration. Regardless of
state law perpetuities rules, any interest created by the exercise
of a Subject Power must either indefeasibly vest or fail no later
than the “Vesting Date,” which shall be one day less than
twenty-one years from the death of any person (any specified
person, regardless of relation to [Senior’s] family or any other
circumstance having to do with the Subject Power’s creation)
who was living on [the date the Children’s Trust became
irrevocable].
6.2 A “Derivative Power” is any power of appointment,
other than a presently exercisable general power, that is created by the exercise of a Subject Power. The effective transitivity of the restrictions contained in this Article [VI] is a
necessary condition for the effectiveness of any exercise of any
Subject Power to the extent the exercise attempts to create a
Derivative Power. In order to be effective in the creation of
any Derivative Power, the instrument exercising the Subject
Power must subject the Derivative Power to all of the vesting
and exercise requirements described in this Article. For purposes of this Article, to the extent an exercise of a power of
appointment p2 newly subjects assets to a preexisting power of
appointment p1, p1 has been “created” by the exercise of p2.
6.3 Any Derivative Power must be exercised, if at all, on
or before the Vesting Date; any interest created by the exercise
of a Derivative Power must either indefeasibly vest or fail no
later than the Vesting Date; in order effectively to create any
power of appointment other than a presently exercisable gen-
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eral power (“Secondary Derivative Power”), the instrument
exercising the Derivative Power must subject the Secondary
Derivative Power to all of the vesting and exercise requirements described in this Article [VI]. Thus, any Secondary Derivative Power must be exercised, if at all, on or before the
Vesting Date; any interest created by the exercise of a Secondary Derivative Power must either indefeasibly vest or fail no
later than the Vesting Date; and in order effectively to create
of any power of appointment other than a presently exercisable general power (“Tertiary Derivative Power”), the instrument exercising the Secondary Derivative Power must subject
the Tertiary Derivative Power to all of the vesting and exercise
requirements described in this Article. And so on through
“Quaternary Derivative Powers” and beyond.
6.4 Any Derivative Power (Secondary Derivative Power,
Tertiary Derivative Power, etc.) over assets of a Trust administered under the provisions of this Declaration shall be subject,
on the Penultimate Date described in Article V (if that Trust is
still being administered on that Date), to the provisions of Article V. For purposes of this Section [6.4], an Outside Trust to
which assets are transferred by the exercise of a Subject Power,
a Derivative Power, a Secondary Derivative Power, a Tertiary
Derivative Power, etc. is not a “Trust administered under the
provisions of this Declaration,” even if some of the provisions
of this Declaration are incorporated in the Outside Trust’s governing instrument.
6.5 For purposes of this Article [VI], an instrument exercising a power of appointment so as to create another power of
appointment may “subject the [created power] to all of the
vesting and exercise requirements described in this Article”
without either reproducing those requirements as they appear
here or expressly referring to this Article of this Declaration.
As long as compliance with the instrument’s express provisions
entails that any effective exercise of the created power will
necessarily comply with all of this Article’s vesting and exercise
requirements, it is irrelevant whether the instrument expressly
refers to those requirements or sets them out.
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FORCED-VESTING PROVISIONS

A. Article V of the Hypothetical Distribution Trust Declaration
1.

The “Ultimate Date”

Article V of the hypothetical Distribution Trust declaration prevents the trustee’s decanting into the Distribution Trust itself from violating the Regulatory RAP. Article V is needed for that purpose
because, again, as far as Michigan law is concerned, future interests in
the Distribution Trust need never vest (or, in case the Children’s Trust
was created by the exercise of a nonfiduciary special power of appointment, need not vest for what could be as much as 352 years).86 So, Section 5.1 pegs the “Ultimate Date” as (1) a date within the Regulatory
RAP testing period and (2) the remotest time for the vesting of future
interests in the assets of the Distribution Trust.87 The Ultimate Date is
determined by adding the margin of the common law perpetuities testing period (twenty-one years) to the remaining life (as of the time of
decanting) of the survivor of a specified pool of measuring lives, all of
which were in existence when the Children’s Trust became
irrevocable.88
As already noted, the Vintage-Power Safe Harbor requires the
Regulatory RAP testing period to be measured from the date on which
the grandfathered trust in question became irrevocable.89 But why
should Section 5.1 assume that for purposes of analogizing the Exempt
Portion to a grandfathered trust (in order to “comply” with the Regulatory RAP) the Children’s Trust is the analogue of the hypothetical
grandfathered trust in question? We have already said, after all, that for
GST tax purposes, the Junior Portion of the Sibling Trust was treated as
a separate trust even before it was actually segregated (as the Junior
Transferor Trust) pursuant to state law.90 Why then is the Junior Portion
not the analogue of the hypothetical grandfathered trust in question?
That presumably would make the date of Junior’s death the relevant
date of irrevocability.
That argument is cogent, as far as it goes. But the regulation makes
irrevocability the touchstone, and irrevocability is surely a question of
state law.91 In terms of trusts recognizable under Michigan law, Junior’s
86

See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.5.1.
88 See supra Part IV.5.1.
89 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
90 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7602(1) (2015) (presumption that an express
trust is revocable based on UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(a) (2010)); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. c (2007) (presumptions regarding revocability).
87
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death simply caused a transfer, under the terms of the Children’s Trust,
from one subtrust of the Children’s Trust (the separate trust for Junior’s
benefit) to another (the Sibling Trust).92 A federal regulatory convention according to which the Junior Portion is treated as a separate trust
for GST tax purposes is simply not competent to establish a trust under
Michigan law.93 Thus, as far as Michigan law is concerned, the trust to
which Junior’s GST exemption was allocated was the Sibling Trust.94
And the Sibling Trust became irrevocable when the Children’s Trust
did.95
Happily, there is nothing in the deployment of the forced-vesting
provisions that hangs on whether the Ultimate Date is determined by
reference to the date of Junior’s death, on the one hand, or that of the
Children’s Trust’s irrevocability, on the other. For purposes of the exposition that follows, we do not care which of the alternative measuring
dates the trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust chooses, so long as she
chooses one. We have her plumping for the date of the Children’s
Trust’s irrevocability, but we need not assume she thinks that choice reflects the best analogy between the Exempt Portion and the hypothetical (nonexistent) grandfathered trust: in the spirit of playing safe, she
may simply prefer the date of the Children’s Trust’s irrevocability as the
more conservative (that is, less advantageous) of the two alternatives.
There is another questionable decision reflected in Section 5.1. The
trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust has evidently plumped for the
common law testing period, as opposed to the Regulatory RAP’s alternative ninety-year term.96 That may seem quite plausible as a choice
between one or the other of those alternatives: given a sufficiently large
pool of measuring lives,97 sufficient youth in the pool, a sufficient
probability of the pool members’ access to, and effective use of, healthcare (owing, perhaps, to affluence and education), etc., it is reasonable
to expect that the Ultimate Date described in Section 5.1 will occur
sometime after 2097, the ninetieth anniversary of the Children’s Trust’s
92

See supra Part II.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.7401 (methods of creating express trusts),
700.7417(1) (trust division facility).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
95 See supra Part II.
96 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
97 N.b., again, that for purposes of the Regulatory RAP, the measuring lives may be
extraneous. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. But note too that it is possible for a
pool for measuring lives to be too large: “If the validating lives are so numerous they
cannot reasonably be traced, the gift may be void.” Dukeminier, supra note 82, at 1654
n.14 (citing In re Villar, 1 Ch. 243, 246-51 (C.A. 1929)); see also RONALD H. MAUDSLEY,
THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUITIES 88-90 (1979); Lawrence Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 18 MICH. L. REV. 1718, 1724 n.15 (1979).
93
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irrevocability. But why guess? Why not simply peg the Ultimate Date as
the later of the ninetieth anniversary of the Children’s Trust’s irrevocability or the twenty-first anniversary of the death of the survivor of a
pool of people who were living when the Children’s Trust became
irrevocable?
The answer is that the ninety-year period specified in the Treasury
regulations as the Regulatory RAP alternative to the common law perpetuities testing period is not a “wait-and-see” period.98 The effective
date regulations set out two alternative tests, one or the other of which
must be satisfied (if grandfathered status is to be preserved) at the time
of exercise of a special power of appointment over grandfathered trust
assets. Thus, a decanting may be unoffending under the regulations if
either (1) it cannot cause postponement of vesting or suspension of absolute ownership or the power of alienation beyond twenty-one years
from the death of some life in being when the grandfathered trust became irrevocable or (2) it cannot cause such a postponement or suspension beyond ninety years from the date of that irrevocability.99
It follows that a decanting that may allow vesting to be postponed
for whichever of the regulations’ alternative testing periods (the common law period or ninety years) turns out to be the longer will satisfy
neither of the alternative tests, for as of the time of decanting, it is possible (1) that vesting will be postponed for longer than twenty-one years
from the death of a life in being when the grandfathered trust became
irrevocable (in case all of the measuring lives terminate prematurely)
and (2) that postponement will continue beyond the ninetieth anniversary of that irrevocability (in case any of the measuring lives demonstrates pronounced longevity). 100 So, a later-of-the-two-periods
specification of the Ultimate Date would violate the Regulatory
RAP.101
2. Forced Vesting in Possession or in Interest
Section 5.2 forces interests in certain trust assets to vest in possession on the Ultimate Date.102 It is a defining characteristic of the assets
in question that they are “still being administered under the provisions
of [the Distribution Trust] as of the Ultimate Date.” This seemingly triv98 For a discussion of the so-called “wait-and-see” provision of the USRAP, see
infra note 176 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also Spica, supra note 7, at 1365.
100 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(D) ex. 6; see also Spica, supra note 7, at
1365-66.
101 See generally Dukeminier, supra note 9, at 194-95.
102 See supra Part IV.5.1. As indicated infra in the text, vesting in possession is just
one (and not necessarily the most advantageous) form of vesting. See, e.g., MAUDSLEY,
supra note 97, at 11-13.
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ial condition is illuminated by Section 5.5, which provides that if assets
of the Distribution Trust are transferred to another trust by the exercise
of a power of appointment (including Trustee’s discretionary power to
make distributions), that other trust is not “administered under the provisions of [the Distribution Trust]” for purposes of Article V.103 As we
shall see, this means that assets of the Distribution Trust can be appointed out from under Article V. And though the assets cannot be appointed out from under the requirements of the Regulatory RAP (not,
at least, without judicial modification of the Distribution Trust declaration), “compliance” with the Regulatory RAP may be achieved by reference (in the appointment) to a (then) more promising pool of measuring
lives (all in being as of the Children’s Trust’s irrevocability)—a pool
promising greater longevity, that is, than the pool used to determine the
Ultimate Date under the Distribution Trust declaration.104
The patently nontrivial condition for assets to be affected by Section 5.2 is that they are not subject, on the Ultimate Date, “either to a
vested interest in someone other than the Primary Beneficiary or to a
presently exercisable general power of appointment (in anyone).”105 It
may seem surprising that presently exercisable general powers of appointment106 are distinguished here from vested interests, given that “a
general power of appointment presently exercisable is, for perpetuities
purposes, treated as absolute ownership in the donee [of the power].”107
But powers of appointment are not classically regarded as property.108
So, to be accurate, Section 5.2 differentiates presently exercisable general powers of appointment and “vested [property] interests.”
Similarly, it may seem surprising that Section 5.2 forces vesting by
transfer of possession. Given that (again) the granting of a presently
exercisable general power of appointment is as good as a distribution
103

See supra Part IV.5.2.
See infra text accompanying notes 166-68.
105 See supra Part IV.5.2.
106 A general power of appointment is a power whose permissible appointees include
the donee, his or her estate, his or her creditors, or the creditors of his or her estate. See,
e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.112(h) (2015). A power is “presently exercisable” if its
exercise is neither required to be by will nor otherwise constrained to be postponed. See,
e.g., id. § 556.112(l).
107 Dukeminier, supra note 82, at 1669. See also, e.g., JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 474.2 at 467 (4th ed. 1942).
108 See, e.g., Laurence M. Jones, The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers
of Appointment in Maryland, 18 MD. L. REV. 93, 96 (1958). Cf. GRAY, supra note 107,
§ 474.2 (acknowledging the historical point, but suggesting that for the RAP’s purposes,
at least, there need be no objection to treating a power of appointment as a property
interest); JOHN A. BORRON, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1272, at 270
(3d ed. 2004) (to the same effect).
104
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outright for purposes of vesting,109 why not dispense with the logistics of
timely distribution and simply provide the “Primary Beneficiary,” by
operation of Section 5.2, a presently exercisable general power of appointment over the assets in question? The answer is that though it may
be preferable in some circumstances for the Primary Beneficiary to hold
a presently exercisable general power of appointment over assets to
which Section 5.2 would otherwise apply, (1) it is within Trustee’s discretion to grant the Primary Beneficiary such a power before the Ultimate
Date (thus making Section 5.2 inapplicable to the extent of that
power)110 and (2) automatic creation of such a power, by operation of
Section 5.2, could cause a problem under the Trap if someone were to
exercise a nonfiduciary special power of appointment so as to subject
assets to the provisions of the Distribution Trust.
The explanation of that problem is complicated enough to warrant
its relegation to an appendix.111 It will suffice to say here that (1) Trustee’s discretionary power to create a presently exercisable general
power of appointment in a beneficiary does not implicate the Trap in the
way a springing (that is, automatically created) power of that quality
would do,112 and (2) the Trap-related concern explained in Appendix B
(below) recommends that we eschew to force vesting under Article V by
means of springing presently exercisable general powers of appointment
and that we rely instead on a combination of mandatory distributions
(pursuant to Section 5.2 itself) and springing vested interests (pursuant
to Section 5.3).
Section 5.2 differentiates powers of appointment and vested interests not only in legal kind,113 but also as to interested persons: it is only
vested interests in persons other than the Primary Beneficiary that exclude assets from Section 5.2’s distribution imperative; whereas a presently exercisable general power of appointment in any person, including
the Primary Beneficiary, is exclusory.114 The reason for the narrower
exclusion for vested interests is that, though there is no awkwardness in
distributing to the Primary Beneficiary assets in which the Primary Beneficiary, and only the Primary Beneficiary, has vested interests, there
can be awkwardness when interests are vested in persons other than the
distributee. Suppose, for example, that Trustee had previously granted
the Primary Beneficiary, PB, a presently exercisable special power of
109

See supra note 107.
See infra text accompanying notes 132-36.
111 See infra Appendix B.
112 Legislative history indicates the Trap was not intended to apply to fiduciary powers of appointment. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
114 See supra Part IV.5.2.
110

374

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:347

appointment, whereupon, PB appointed the annual net income of the
separate trust in question to the children of person A (who was living on
the date the Children’s Trust became irrevocable); on the Ultimate
Date, A and two of her children are living. In that case, though the class
of A’s children is subject to open (because A is alive),115 the interests of
A’s living children are vested.116 Rather than force the distribution of
the assets subject to A’s children’s income interest, Section 5.2 leaves
the assets to be dealt with by Section 5.3.
Section 5.3 does three things pertaining to those assets: (1) it causes
all interests in them that, as of the Ultimate Date, are neither vested nor
subject to a presently exercisable general power of appointment (in anyone) to vest, on the Ultimate Date, by the operation of the Section itself, in the Primary Beneficiary; (2) it closes, as of the Ultimate Date,
every class (concerning vesting) that is subject to open on that Date; and
(3) it allows the assets to continue to be held in trust until the last interest prior to the remotest remainder terminates.117 Thus, in our example
above, on the Ultimate Date, PB would obtain (by operation of Section
5.3) a vested remainder in the assets subject to the income interest in
A’s children,118 the class of A’s children would close (for this purpose),
the assets would continue to be held in trust until the death of the survivor of those of A’s children who were living on the Ultimate Date, and
on the death of that survivor, the assets would be distributed to PB or
her estate.
At common law, the existence of a power of appointment by which
a remainder in default might be destroyed did not render the subject
remainder contingent—the remainder was vested (if it was not otherwise
contingent) notwithstanding that it was liable to be cut off by the exercise of the power.119 So, if remainders created by operation of Section
5.3120 were cast as reminders in default of any outstanding power of ap115

See, e.g., MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 20.
See id. at 23.
117 See supra Part IV.5.3.
118 N.b., in creating a vested remainder on the Ultimate Date in the hypothetical,
Section 5.3 (of the hypothetical Distribution Trust declaration) contradicts, and by contradicting disarms, Michigan’s anti-lapse statute, according to which, “a future interest
under the terms of a trust is contingent on the beneficiary [sic] surviving the distribution
date.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2714(1) (2015). Contradiction disarms the anti-lapse statute, because the statute is a rule of construction. See id. § 700.2701.
119 See, e.g., MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 13; GRAY, supra note 107, §§ 112.1, 258;
BORRON ET AL., supra note 108, § 113; HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY & RONALD
HARLING MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY 61 (Jill E. Martin ed., 13th ed. 1989).
120 On the one hand, “remainder“ is used here in its technical sense to mean any
interest or estate (including an income interest or life estate) that succeeds a given “particular estate.” See GRAY, supra note 107, § 8 at 5. So, if two successive life estates precede a remainder in fee, then with respect to the first of the life estates, both the
116
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pointment other than a presently exercisable general power,121 and the
Regulatory RAP involved the same conception of vesting, there would
be no need to terminate such powers before the Ultimate Date, as Section 5.4 does, in order to satisfy the vesting requirements of the Regulatory RAP. But at common law, the RAP constrained powers of
appointment, not only by invalidating offending interests created by
their exercise, but also by sometimes invalidating the powers themselves:
excepting presently exercisable general powers, a power of appointment
was invalid at common law unless it could only be exercised (if at all)
within the perpetuities testing period.122 (That is why perpetuities reform statutes refer to powers of appointment as well as “interests.”)123
This particular aspect of the common law RAP’s control, that is, the
prescription of the period during which a valid testamentary general or
special power of appointment must be exercised (if at all), technically
cannot be formulated in terms of the power’s “vesting.” To be vested (or
not; that is, contingent) is an attribute of a certain kind of property,124
viz., future interests,125 and, again, powers of appointment are not classically regarded as property.126 On the other hand, the Regulatory RAP
speaks only in terms of the postponement of vesting (or suspension of
absolute ownership or the power of alienation).127 So, on a technical
reading, the Regulatory RAP might be supposed to be indifferent to the
period during which a power of appointment (over grandfathered assecondary life estate and the fee are “remainders.” On the other hand, the term is used
loosely here to refer to certain future interests in personalty as well as real estate, though
“the idea of a vested remainder is peculiar to the English law of real estate . . . and is not
strictly applicable to personal property.” Id. § 971. “For purposes of the rule against perpetuities, at least, a limitation which would be a vested remainder in the case of realty is
treated as a vested remainder.” Id.
121 It must be remembered that Section 5.3 (of the hypothetical Distribution Trust
declaration) has no application to assets subject, on the Ultimate Date, to any presently
exercisable general power of appointment. That leaves special powers, testamentary general powers, and nontestamentary general powers subject to unsatisfied conditions precedent for the Section 5.4 to control. See, e.g., MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 60-61;
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 803-05 (8th ed. 2009).
122 See, e.g., MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 60-61; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 68, at 922 (8th ed. 2009).
123 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.72(2)-(3) (2015) (Michigan’s USRAP),
554.93(2)(b)-(c) (2015) (PPTPA).
124 “Property” is used here in the strict sense in which the term refers to legal interests in determinate things, not to the things themselves. See WESLEY NEWCOMB
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
28-29 (photo. reprint 1978) (1929).
125 See, e.g., MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 7-10; GRAY, supra note 107, §§ 101 (vesting of legal interests), 116 (vesting of equitable interests identical to that of legal
interests).
126 See supra note 108.
127 See supra note 9.
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sets) may be exercised provided the power cannot delay the vesting of
future interests in the affected (grandfathered) assets. It would seem
more prudent, however, to suppose that the Regulatory RAP simply
reflects an imperfect appreciation of the RAP’s traditional, twofold application to powers of appointment and that it is, therefore, liable to be
interpreted128 as having, mutatis mutandis, as broad a concern with vesting as the common law rule has.
That, in any case, is the interpretation of the Regulatory RAP that
informs the forced-vesting provisions of the hypothetical Distribution
Trust: Section 5.4 forces any power of appointment, other than a presently exercisable general power, over assets still being administered
under the Distribution Trust declaration as of the day before the Ultimate Date, the “Penultimate Date,” to lapse as of the last discernable
moment of the Penultimate Date.129 The upshot is (1) that each testamentary general or special power of appointment over assets of the Distribution Trust must be exercised (if at all) within the testing period
prescribed by the Regulatory RAP, (2) that every condition precedent
to the exercise of a nontestamentary general power over assets of the
Distribution Trust must be satisfied (if at all) within the Regulatory testing period, and (3) that no remainder vested on the Ultimate Date by
operation of Section 5.3 is subject to a special power of appointment, a
testamentary general power, or a nontestamentary general power subject to an unsatisfied condition precedent.
Of course, to achieve those results, Section 5.4 has to include Trustee’s discretionary distribution power among the special powers of appointment that the Section terminates.130 This means that Trustee’s
ability to avert the automatic effects of Article V terminates in the last
discernable moment of the Penultimate Date.131 Before that moment,
Trustee can circumvent Article V by creating a sufficient number of
vested interests, by granting a sufficient number of presently exercisable
general powers of appointment, or by decanting.
3. Trustee’s Ability to Avert Article V by Granting Presently
Exercisable General Powers of Appointment
Granting presently exercisable general powers of appointment will
circumvent Article V for the same reason creating vested interests will:
again, the granting of a presently exercisable general power of appoint128

Perhaps according to the view described parenthetically supra in note 108.
See supra Part IV.5.4.
130 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (trustee’s discretionary distribution
power is a special power of appointment).
131 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
129
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ment is as good as a distribution outright for purposes of vesting.132
Hence Article V does not apply to assets that are subject, on the Ultimate Date, to a presently exercisable general power of appointment.133
As with the power to decant under the Children’s Trust instrument, we
must assume here that the Distribution Trust declaration does not explicitly rule out Trustee’s granting presently exercisable general powers
of appointment.134 But we need not suppose that the declaration explicitly authorizes it, for the same common law authorities that infer a presumptive power to decant from a trustee’s broad discretion to make
distributions135 likewise infer a presumptive power to create powers of
appointment in, or for the exclusive benefit of, permissible
distributees.136
Trustee may have various reasons for granting a beneficiary a presently exercisable general power of appointment, but it bears mentioning
here that one reason may be the GST tax. Suppose, for instance, that
the Penultimate Date is approaching; PB is the Primary Beneficiary of a
trust that is still being administered under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration; none of the assets of the trust is subject either to
a vested interest in someone other than PB or to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment (in anyone); PB has one child, PBC, and
a grandchild, PBGC, who is PBC’s daughter; PB expects that the most
advantageous distributions from the trust during the remainder of PB’s
lifetime will be made infrequently to PB herself, occasionally to PBC,
and regularly to PBGC; PB has already made gifts in excess of the exclusion amount of the unified credit,137 and PB’s GST exemption is allocated elsewhere.
In that case, Trustee may consider whether it would be in the best
interests of PB and her descendants if PBGC should be granted a presently exercisable general power of appointment over the trust. If Trustee
does nothing, the assets of the trust will be distributed outright to PB on
the Ultimate Date (pursuant to Section 5.2),138 and PB will become the
“transferor” of those assets for GST tax purposes.139 That will make
PB’s pre-planning preference for regular transfers to PBGC expensive.
But granting PBGC a presently exercisable general power of appoint132

See supra note 107.
See supra Part IV.5.1-5.4.
134 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 19.14 (2011); See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 19.3
cmt. a illus. 2, 19.4 (1986).
137 I.e., the credit described in I.R.C. § 2010.
138 See supra Part IV.5.2.
139 See I.R.C. § 2652(a)(1) (defining “transferor” for GST tax purposes).
133
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ment will make GST tax irrelevant, and gift tax tangential, to that preference: transfers of the assets (whether by PBGC or Trustee) to PB and
PBC will be subject to federal gift tax (payable by PBGC),140 but
PBGC will be the “transferor” for GST tax purposes,141 and transfers of
the assets by Trustee to PBGC will be transfer-tax nonevents.
This analysis tacitly relies on a principle that we should make explicit in light of the possibility that Trustee will seek releases from PB
and PBC if she decides to grant PBGC a presently exercisable general
power of appointment. The principle is that a potential taker in default
of the exercise of a special power of appointment is not treated as a
donor, for gift tax purposes, when the special power is exercised.142 That
means PB will not be treated as having made a gift to PBGC, at the time
Trustee grants PBGC the general power, notwithstanding that if Trustee
had instead done nothing, the assets of the trust would have been distributed outright to PB on the Ultimate Date. This comports with the
fact that, before the last discernable moment of the Penultimate Date,
PB has no enforceable right to any distribution from the trust143—
before the last discernable moment of the Penultimate Date, PB’s equitable interest is liable to be completely cut off if Trustee exercises her
special power of appointment in favor of one of PB’s descendants.144
For the same reason, Trustee’s asking PB or PBC for a release
before granting PBGC the presently exercisable general power should
be indifferent. Trustee is not conferring, by that request or otherwise, a
general power of appointment on PB or PBC. She is merely inquiring
about their current dispositions to criticize or applaud Trustee’s intended course of action (in light of the relevant tax planning and nontax
considerations) and asking them, in case their dispositions are favorable,
to be bound (and to bind those the law allows them to represent) by
140 See TAM 9535008 (May 8, 1995). We should note too that PBGC will be the
owner of the trust’s assets for federal income tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 678(a).
141 See id. § 2514(b) (indicating that the holder of a general power of appointment is
treated, for gift tax purposes, as the donor of assets subject to the power); see also id.
§ 2652(a)(1) (indicating that in case of property subject to gift tax, “transferor” means
donor).
142 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(e) ex. 3 (indicating that when a special power of
appointment is exercised, the taker in default of exercise is not treated, for gift tax purposes, as the donor of a gift); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text (identifying a
trustee’s power to make discretionary distributions as a fiduciary special power of appointment); see also supra note 136 and accompanying text (indicating that an implied
power to create powers of appointment will be inferred from a trustee’s broad power to
make discretionary distributions).
143 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7505 (2015) (creditor of discretionary trust beneficiary has no right to trust income or principal that may be distributed only in the exercise
of the trustee’s discretion).
144 See supra note 27.
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their current dispositions. Neither PB nor PBC can compel Trustee to
do anything merely by granting or withholding the proffered release;
neither of them can appropriate Trustee’s discretion merely by virtue of
having been consulted in this way.
Our analysis of the PB-PBC-PBGC hypothetical also tacitly relies
on another principle we should make explicit, viz., that Trustee’s exercise of her discretionary distribution power to create a presently exercisable general power of appointment will not cause the assets subject to
the created power to be included in Trustee’s transfer tax base by the
Trap. Again, the Trap provides that assets subject to a power of appointment (first power) are included in the power holder’s (H’s) transfer tax
base (gift tax base or gross estate depending on whether the triggering
exercise is effectively testamentary) to the extent H exercises the power
by creating a second power (over the assets in question) that “under the
applicable local law can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of [future interests in the assets], or suspend the absolute ownership
or power of alienation of such [assets], for a period ascertainable without regard to the date of creation of the first power.”145
Now, Trustee’s discretionary distribution power is a power of appointment.146 And the Distribution Trust is a new trust created as of the
time the Junior Transferor Trust is decanted,147 which means that to the
extent the Distribution Trust holds personal property, PPTPA applies.148 And that means any presently exercisable general power of appointment Trustee creates over the Trust’s assets will be capable of
postponing the vesting of future interests in those assets for a period
without end,149 a period that would, therefore, be “ascertainable,” if at
all, “without regard to the date of creation of [Trustee’s] power.”150 If
PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision applied, it would limit the period during
which vesting could be postponed by the exercise of the created presently exercisable general power to a finite period (of 360 years) measured from the date Trustee’s power was created.151 But because Trap
springing can sometimes be beneficial for tax purposes,152 PPTPA’s
145

See supra note 2.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 38-39.
148 See supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 38-39.
149 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.93 (2015).
150 I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3); see supra text accompanying note 145.
151 See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.93(3) (PPTPA provision), 554.75(2) (ancillary USRAP provision extending standard 90-year “wait-and-see” period to 360 years for antiTrap purpose).
152 E.g., when a special power holder’s death would otherwise be a “taxable termination” within the meaning of the GST tax and the attributable GST tax would be more
than the attributable estate tax under the Trap. See generally James P. Spica, A Practical
146
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anti-Trap provision does not apply whenever a special power is exercised so as to create a presently exercisable general power153—thus
making Trap springing by the creation of such powers elective.154
What is important for our purposes here, however, is that assuming
the Children’s Trust was not created or augmented by the exercise of a
nonfiduciary special power of appointment, PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision also does not apply when a presently exercisable general power of
appointment is created by Trustee’s discretionary distribution power for
the independent reason that Trustee’s discretionary distribution power
is a fiduciary power of appointment155 and legislative history indicates
that the Trap was not intended to apply to exercises of purely fiduciary
powers like a trustee’s discretionary power to invade principal.156
That explains the relevant contour of the anti-Trap provision: since
such a provision cannot usefully be triggered in circumstances that do
not trigger the Trap, PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision does not apply to any
power of appointment created by a trustee’s discretionary distribution
power unless the distribution power was itself created by the exercise of
a nonfiduciary special power of appointment.157 It also explains why
Trustee’s creation of a presently exercisable general power of appointment over assets of the Distribution Trust will not cause those assets to
be included in Trustee’s transfer tax base under the Trap: the Trap does
apply to exercises of purely fiduciary powers of appointment.
4. Trustee’s Ability to Avert Article V by Decanting
Decanting can circumvent Article V because (1) Article V applies
only to assets that are still being administered, as of the Ultimate Date,
under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration,158 and (2)
Section 5.5 provides that a distinct trust whose terms differ in any way
from those of the Distribution Trust and to which Distribution Trust assets are transferred by the exercise of a power of appointment (includLook at Springing the Delaware Tax Trap to Avert Generation Skipping Transfer Tax, 41
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 165 (2006); Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Jeffrey N. Pennell,
Using “Delaware Tax Trap” to Avoid Generation-Skipping Taxes, 68 J. TAX’N 242 (1988).
153 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.93(3) (2015) (PPTPA anti-Trap provision); see also
id. § 554.92(e) (defining ‘second power’ for purposes of section 554.93(3)).
154 See Spica, supra note 1, at 683 n.49.
155 See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.92; 554.93(3). The assumption (in the text) that the
Children’s Trust was not created by the exercise of a nonfiduciary special power of appointment averts the complexity of “second-order fiduciary powers” within the meaning
of PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision, concerning which see id. § 554.92(d). See also Spica,
supra note 14, at 79-81.
156 See S. REP. No. 82-382, at 1 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1535, 1535.
157 See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.92; 554.93(3).
158 See supra Part IV.5.1-5.4.
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ing Trustee’s discretionary power to make distributions) is not a trust
administered under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration
for purposes of Article V.159 Of course, Trustee may have various reasons to decant.160 But, as we shall see, the provisions in Article VI of the
hypothetical Distribution Trust declaration may allow Trustee to decant
in a way that will extend the period during which the vesting of future
interests in the Distribution Trust’s assets may be postponed without violating the Regulatory RAP.161
Suppose, for example, that sometime before the last discernable
moment of the Penultimate Date, Trustee decants a trust, T1, that is then
being administered under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration into a new trust, T2, whose provisions are identical to those of T1
except that the measuring lives specified on the “Schedule B” attached
to the T2 trust instrument are different (though all were in being as of
the Children’s Trust’s irrevocability, they are, perhaps, on average,
younger, better educated, more geographically dispersed, more diversified professionally, or more numerous) than those on the Schedule B
attached to the Distribution Trust declaration. In that case, the latest
permissible time for the vesting of future interests in the assets of T2 will
be effectively dictated by Article VI of the Distribution Trust declaration, rather than by Article V, for, again, Article V applies only to assets
that are still being administered, as of the Ultimate Date, under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration, and Section 5.5 provides
that a decanting receptacle whose terms differ in any way from those of
the Distribution Trust is not a trust administered under the provisions of
the Distribution Trust declaration, “even if some of the provisions of
[the Distribution Trust declaration] are incorporated in the [receptacle’s] governing instrument.”162
B. Article VI
1.

Equitable Interests Created by a “Subject Power”

Article VI of the hypothetical Distribution Trust declaration prevents the decanting of T1 into T2 (in the example above) from violating
the Regulatory RAP—something decanting might otherwise do because, again, the applicability of PPTPA is a function of the vintages of
trusts subject to Michigan law, and T2 will be viewed (under Michigan
law) as a new trust created as of the time of the decanting.163 Section 6.1
pegs the “Vesting Date” as the remotest time for the vesting of future
159
160
161
162
163

See supra Part IV.5.5.
See, e.g., Culp & Mellen, supra note 12, at 13-16.
See infra text accompanying notes 166-68.
See supra Part IV.5.5.
See supra note 38 and text accompanying notes 38-39.
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interests created by the exercise of a “Subject Power,” which is any
power of appointment (including Trustee’s discretionary distribution
power) that is expressly created by the Distribution Trust declaration.164
Thus, because T2 was created by the exercise of a Subject Power, interests in T2’s assets must either indefeasibly vest or fail on or before a
specified date that qualifies as a Vesting Date within the meaning of
Section 6.1. To the extent the provisions of T2 fail to enforce this requirement, Trustee’s attempted exercise of her discretionary distribution
power (in settling T2) will be ineffective.165
A Vesting Date is determined by adding the margin of the common
law perpetuities testing period (twenty-one years) to the remaining life
(as of the time the Subject Power in question is exercised) of “any specified person, regardless of relation to [Senior’s] family or any other circumstance having to do with the Subject Power’s creation,” who was
living on the date the Children’s Trust became irrevocable.166 Thus, the
measuring lives specified on the Schedule B attached to the T2 trust instrument must have been in existence when the Children’s Trust became
irrevocable, but, otherwise, they need not have any connection at all
with Senior, the Children’s Trust, or the Schedule B attached to the Distribution Trust declaration.167 So, if Trustee thinks the survivor of the
measuring lives on the Schedule B attached to the Distribution Trust
declaration is likely to die before the survivor of an alternative, identifiable, and manageable168 pool, she can substitute (or add) the alternative
pool—thereby substituting the entailed Article VI Vesting Date for the
Article V Ultimate Date—by decanting.169
164

See supra Part IV.6.1.
See supra note 66.
166 See supra Part IV.6.1.
167 Again, for purposes of the Regulatory RAP, the measuring lives may be extraneous. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 97.
169 Note that under Michigan law, the question whether Trustee has a duty to consider decanting for the purpose described in the text (or any other purpose) will depend
on whether there is anything in the Distribution Trust declaration to overcome the presumption in section 7815 of the Michigan Trust Code (MTC), according to which,
“[u]nless the trust instrument expressly provides otherwise, a trustee is not liable to a
beneficiary for failure to exercise the power described in . . . section 5a of the powers of
appointment act.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7815(2) (2015) (emphasis added); see id.
§ 556.115a(1)-(2)(a) (codifying common law decanting power).
Of course, the discretionary distribution power is subject to Trustee’s general fiduciary duties. See id. § 700.7815(1); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 86 cmt. b
(2007). But the standard for judicial supervision of discretionary powers is abuse of discretion. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7815(1); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 87. This author is not aware of a case in which a court has held that a trustee
abused her discretion by deciding not to exercise her discretionary distribution power to
make a distribution in trust (or, for that matter, to grant a power of appointment). See,
165
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2. Legal Interests
Section 6.1 applies to legal as well as equitable interests created by
exercise of a Subject Power. But in most circumstances, the Section is
not actually needed, under Michigan law, to prevent a violation of the
Regulatory RAP when a Subject Power is exercised to appoint assets
free of trust. Suppose, for example, that instead of decanting the assets
of T1 into T2 (in the example above), Trustee distributes those assets to
PB for life, then to PBC for life, remainder to PB‘s descendants living at
the time of PBC’s death. For GST tax purposes, this distribution is
equivalent to a decanting, for it creates an “arrangement [ ] which, although not a trust, has substantially the same effect as a trust” within
the meaning of Code section 2652.170 And the distribution might be liable to violate the Regulatory RAP if, for instance, PB was born after the
Children’s Trust became irrevocable, for in that case, the remainders to
PBC and PB’s remoter descendants171 would violate the common law
RAP.172
e.g., Blattmachr et al., supra note 53, at 159 (“An abuse of discretion or breach of trust
presumably would occur only if the decanting power is exercised beyond its scope”);
Culp & Mellen, supra note 12, at 48 (discussing “fiduciary issues” of decanting in terms of
“a trustee’s decision to decant,” but without regard to a trustee’s decision not to decant).
Yet, it is possible, in principle, for a failure to exercise any trustee power to constitute an
abuse. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. at 256 (reporter’s “examples of
nonexercise of discretion”).
As applied to the decanting power, that possibility is presumptively foreclosed by
MTC section 7815. Thus, the settlor of a trust subject to Michigan law is presumed to
intend the decanting power to be a fiduciary “privilege” in the Hohfeldian sense, that is,
as a power the trustee may, but is not obligated, to exercise. See HOHFELD, supra
note 124, at 38-42. And this is true when the settlor of the trust in question created that
trust while acting in a fiduciary capacity as the trustee of another trust. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 700.7103(i) (“settlor” defined for MTC purposes to include a trustee who creates
a trust). So, a Distribution Trust beneficiary will be heard to allege that a particular instance of decanting involved a breach of fiduciary duty, but unless the Distribution Trust
declaration expressly directs Trustee to decant when Trustee considers decanting to be in
the best interests of the beneficiary, the beneficiary will not be heard to allege that Trustee’s failure to decant constitutes a breach.
170 See I.R.C. § 2652(b)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1(b).
171 See supra note 120.
172 Because Trustee’s discretionary distribution power is a special power of appointment (see supra note 68 and accompanying text), the common law perpetuities testing
period runs from the creation of Trustee’s power, and because Trustee’s power was created by a succession of special powers, its creation is “related back” to the date on which
the Children’s Trust became irrevocable (assuming the Children’s Trust was not itself
created by the exercise of a testamentary general or special power of appointment). See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 17.4 cmt. f
(2011); MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 62; GRAY, supra note 107, §§ 514-15. (For an example of codification of the common law rule on this point, see MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 556.124(1).) Thus, in light of the possibility that PB will live beyond twenty-one years
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In fact, though, the common law RAP was supplanted in Michigan
by the adoption of the USRAP,173 which PPTPA overlies: under the
Michigan perpetuities regime as reformed by PPTPA, the USRAP continues to apply to real property (however held) and to personal property
not held in trust.174 So, in our example, because the hypothesized distribution is not actually in trust, the USRAP governs the validity of PBC‘s
and PB’s remoter descendants’ remainders.
The common law perpetuities testing period is still relevant under
the USRAP because an interest that must vest, if at all, within that period is, for that reason, valid under the USRAP.175 But an interest that
may vest beyond the common law testing period is not invalid under the
USRAP until the ninety-year “wait-and-see” period elapses.176 For future interests created by the exercise of a testamentary general or special power of appointment, the USRAP’s testing and wait-and-see
periods both run from the time the power is created.177 So, because
Trustee’s discretionary distribution power is a special power of appointment,178 the USRAP’s testing and wait-and-see periods both run from
the time Trustee’s power was created; and because Trustee’s power was
created through a succession of special powers, its creation is “related
back” to the date on which the Children’s Trust became irrevocable (assuming the Children’s Trust was not itself created by the exercise of a
testamentary general or special power of appointment).179
To be valid under Michigan law, then, PBC‘s and PB’s remoter descendants’ remainders (in our last example above) must either (1) be
bound, as of the time of Trustee’s distribution to PB, to vest or fail
within twenty-one years from the death of some life in being on the date
the Children’s Trust became irrevocable or (2) actually vest or fail
within ninety years from that date of irrevocability. Section 6.1 ensures
that the first of these tests will be met.180 But if Section 6.1 did not apply
from the death of any life in being when the Children’s Trust became irrevocable, the
remainders to PBC and PB’s remoter descendants would both be void ab initio at common law. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 68, at 892 (8th ed. 2009).
173 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.53 (“Unless as otherwise provided by statute, this
act [i.e., 1948 Mich. Pub. Act No. 38 (effective September 23, 1949) (codified at MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 554.51) (making the common law RAP applicable to real and personal
property)] shall not apply to nonvested property interests created on or after the effective
date of the uniform statutory rule against perpetuities.”).
174 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.94; see generally Spica, supra note 7, at 1372, 137576.
175 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.72(1) (2015).
176 See id.; see also Spica, supra note 7, at 1353-54.
177 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.124(1).
178 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
179 See MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 554.72(1), 556.124(1), 556.125.
180 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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to legal as well as equitable interests created by a Subject Power, the
Regulatory RAP would still be satisfied in our example because, as a
matter of Michigan law, any legal future interest created by Trustee that
is not bound, as of the time the interest is created, to vest or fail within
twenty-one years from the death of some life in being on the date the
Children’s Trust became irrevocable must either vest or fail within
ninety years of that date of irrevocability.181 If such an interest does not
actually vest (by chance or reformation)182 within that period, the USRAP invalidates it.183
There is one way, however, in which Trustee could go wrong in creating legal future interests in beneficiaries. We have already seen that a
certain later-of-two-periods specification of the Ultimate Date would violate the Regulatory RAP.184 So, it is not surprising that in this context,
a similar specification will disarm the USRAP’s protection. Suppose
that PB (in the example above) was born after the Children’s Trust became irrevocable, and Trustee specifies that the remainder in PB’s
remoter descendants will become possessory only if PBC dies before the
later of the ninetieth anniversary of the Children’s Trust’s irrevocability
or the twenty-first anniversary of the death of the last survivor of the
measuring lives on the Schedule B attached to the Distribution Trust
declaration; if PBC is alive on the later of those anniversaries, she takes
the property “in fee.”185
In that case, the remainders are valid under Michigan law because
(1) the alternative contingencies doctrine—part of the common law
RAP186—treats a transfer under a later-of-two-events provision as being
made on two separate conditions, each to be evaluated separately,187
and (2) the alternative contingencies doctrine is expressly incorporated
in the USRAP.188 Thus, on the one hand, if the period based on the
measuring lives included on Schedule B turns out to be the longer of the
two periods specified by Trustee, the USRAP will have validated the
remainders by reference to the common law testing period.189 If, on the
181

See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.72 (2015).
Reformation may remedy or avert invalidity under the USRAP, but such reformation must always yield vesting within the wait-and-see period. See id. § 554.74.
183 See id. § 554.72(1).
184 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
185 That is, in that case, PBC becomes the absolute owner. See GRAY, supra note 107,
§ 971 n.3 (concerning the resolution of a “vested remainder” in personalty). Concerning
the use generally, for purposes of the RAP, of terminology borrowed from the English
law of real estate, see supra note 120.
186 See, e.g., MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 66-67.
187 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 107, § 341; BORRON ET AL., supra note 108, § 1257;
Dukeminier, supra note 9, at 190-91.
188 See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1 cmt. H (2014).
189 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.72(1)(a) (2015); see also id. §§ 556.124(1), 556.125.
182
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other hand, the ninety-year period turns out to be the longer of the two,
the USRAP will validate the remainders by reference to the wait-andsee period.190
If it applied, section 1(e) of the USRAP might cause Trustee’s contingent use of the ninety-year term to be disregarded in this context.191
But Michigan’s version of section 1(e) of the uniform act applies only to
alternative-contingencies provisions that measure periods from the creation of trusts (or other property arrangements) that are actually eligible
by vintage to be grandfathered under the GST tax effective date regulations, that is, from the creation of trusts (or other arrangements) that
were irrevocable on September 25, 1985.192 If the Children’s Trust were
actually grandfathered under the effective date regulations, Michigan’s
version of section 1(e) would prevent Trustee’s contingency provision
for the vesting of PBC’s and PB’s remoter descendants’ remainders
from violating the Regulatory RAP by reading the alternative ninetyyear term out of that provision.193 But the Children’s Trust is too new
actually to be grandfathered.194 So, Michigan’s version of section 1(e) is
inapplicable.
The upshot is that Trustee has created (in our example) an arrangement of legal interests in PB and her descendants that is valid under
Michigan law, is a trust for GST tax purposes,195 and violates the Regulatory RAP. It violates the Regulatory RAP because, again, as of the
time of Trustee’s exercise of her discretionary distribution power, it is
possible (1) that vesting will be postponed for longer than twenty-one
years from the death of some life in being at the time the Children’s
Trust became irrevocable (in case all of the measuring lives included on
Schedule B terminate prematurely) and (2) that postponement will continue beyond the ninetieth anniversary of that irrevocability (in case any
of the measuring lives on Schedule B demonstrates pronounced
longevity).196
The possibility of Trustee’s unwarily subjecting legal interests in distributed trust property to a later-of-two-events vesting provision is one
reason for making Section 6.1 applicable to legal as well as equitable
interests. Another is the possibility of a change of governing law. If, for
example, the Distribution Trust or one of its scions should migrate so as
to become subject, for purposes of determining the meaning and effect
190

See id. § 554.72(1)(b).
See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(e); see also Dukeminier,
supra note 9, at 191-94, 197-202.
192 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.72(5); see also Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1).
193 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.72(5).
194 See supra text accompanying note 26.
195 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
191
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of its terms, to the law of a jurisdiction that has no RAP for personal
property regardless of how such property is held, then Trustee’s creation
of legal interests in distributed trust property would be liable to violate
the Regulatory RAP regardless of alternative contingencies.197
But the best reason for making Section 6.1 applicable to legal as
well as equitable interests is perspicuity: without any inkling of the general benignity (apart from alternative contingencies) of the USRAP’s
application in Michigan to legal interests in personalty not held in trust,
a trustee (or Service examiner) can see from Section 6.1 itself that any
effective exercise of a Subject Power to create a future interest (whether
in personalty held in trust, personalty otherwise held, or in realty) cannot violate the Regulatory RAP.
3. “Derivative Powers”
Section 6.2 makes the “transitivity” of the requirements of Article
VI of the Distribution Trust declaration a condition for the effective exercise of any Subject Power, including Trustee’s discretionary distribution power,198 to the extent the exercise attempts to create a “Derivative
Power,” which is any power of appointment, other than a presently exercisable general power.199 Thus, for example, if Trustee decants a trust,
T1, that is then being administered under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration into a new trust, T2, and the terms of T2 purport to
grant beneficiaries testamentary general or special powers of appointment over assets of T2, the terms of T2 must subject those Derivative
Powers to all of the Derivative Powers requirements of Article VI of the
Distribution Trust declaration. Otherwise, Trustee will simply have
failed to create the Derivative Powers in question.200
The Derivative Powers requirements of Article VI are threefold.
Section 6.3 requires that any interest created by the exercise of a Derivative Power must vest or fail no later than some specified Vesting
Date201—no later, that is, than a particular date that (1) qualifies as a
Vesting Date within the meaning of Section 6.1 and (2) is specified at
the time the Derivative Power is created.202 Thus, the requirement for
the vesting of future interests created by the exercise of a Subject Power
cannot be evaded by the holder’s creation of a testamentary general or
197 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(E) ex. 4 (describing one circumstance in
which change of trust situs could result in loss of grandfathered status).
198 See supra Part IV.6.1.
199 See supra Part IV.6.2.
200 See supra note 66.
201 See supra Part IV.6.3.
202 See supra Part IV.6.1, 6.3.
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special power of appointment rather than an interest.203 Section 6.3 also
requires that any Derivative Power must be exercised, if at all, no later
than the Vesting Date.204 This comports with the common law prescription that a power of appointment other than a presently exercisable general power is invalid unless it can only be exercised (if at all) within the
perpetuities testing period205 and the assumption that the Regulatory
RAP should be interpreted as having, mutatis mutandis, as broad a concern with vesting as the common law rule has.206
Finally, Section 6.3 requires that in order to be effective in creating
any power of appointment other than a presently exercisable general
power (Secondary Derivative Power), the instrument exercising a Derivative Power must subject the Secondary Derivative Power to all of the
Derivative Powers requirements of Article VI.207 And, of course, this
requirement will ramify with powers of appointment other than presently exercisable general powers created by the exercise of a Secondary
Derivative Power (Tertiary Derivative Powers), powers other than presently exercisable general powers created by the exercise of a Tertiary
Derivative Power (Quaternary Derivative Powers), and so on.
Suppose, for example, Trustee decants a trust, T1, that is then being
administered under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration
into a new trust, T2, and the terms of T2 effectively grant beneficiary B1 a
special power of appointment over the assets of T2; B1 effectively exercises her special power to appoint the assets of T2 to a new trust, T3, and
the terms of T3 effectively grant the trustee of T3, TR3, a fully discretionary distribution power; TR3 decants T3 into a new trust, T4, and the
terms of T4 effectively grant beneficiary B2 a special power of appointment over the assets of T4; B2 effectively exercises her special power to
appoint the assets of T4 . . . TRn-1 decants Tn-1 into a new trust, Tn, and
the terms of Tn effectively grant beneficiary Bn/2 a special power of appointment over the assets of Tn. Let us assume too that neither the Ultimate Date nor any Vesting Date referred to in the Distribution Trust
declaration has occurred, that none of the trusts involved has been modified judicially, and that none of them is “administered under the provisions of [the Distribution Trust declaration]” for purposes of Article
V.208
In that case, no matter how large the number n is, we know (1) that
any interest created by the exercise of Bn/2’s special power of appoint203
204
205
206
207
208

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note 164 and accompanying text.
Part IV.6.1, 6.3.
note 122 and accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 128-29.
Part IV.6.3.
Part IV.5.5; see also supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
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ment must vest or fail no later than a specified date that qualifies as a
Vesting Date within the meaning of Section 6.1;209 (2) that Bn/2’s special
power itself must be exercised, if at all, no later than such a Vesting
Date;210 and (3) that in order to be effective in creating any power of
appointment other than a presently exercisable general power, an instrument exercising Bn/2’s special power must subject the created power
to all of the Derivative Powers requirements of Article VI of the Distribution Trust declaration.211 That is to say, we know that an exercise of
Bn/2’s special power of appointment cannot violate the Regulatory RAP.
We know these things because in order effectively to create B1’s
Derivative Power over the assets of T2, the instrument exercising Trustee’s Subject Power over the assets of T1 (the T2 trust instrument) had to
subject the Derivative Power to the requirements of Article VI of the
Distribution Trust declaration;212 and in order effectively to create TR3’s
Secondary Derivative Power over the assets of T3, the instrument exercising B1’s Derivative Power over the assets of T2 had to subject the
Secondary Derivative Power to the requirements of Article VI;213 and in
order effectively to create B2’s Tertiary Derivative Power over the assets
of T4, the instrument exercising TR3’s Secondary Derivative Power over
the assets of T3 had to subject the Tertiary Derivative Power to the requirements of Article VI; and so on. Thus, the assumption that the creation of each successive special power of appointment in the example is
effective entails the transitivity of Article VI’s guarantee that the Regulatory RAP will not be violated by the exercise of any power descended
from a Subject Power.
We must return, however, to the assumption that none of the trusts
in the series T2, T3, T4, . . . Tn is “administered under the provisions of
[the Distribution Trust declaration]” for purposes of Article V.214 That
assumption is arbitrary. It does not follow from the stipulation that each
trust is a “new” trust created by the exercise of a special power held by
one of the power holders in the series Trustee, B1, TR3, B2 . . . TRn-1, for
any trust whose terms do not differ from those of the Distribution Trust
may constitute a “Trust administered under the provisions of [the Distribution Trust declaration]” for purposes of Article V.215 Suppose, for instance, that B1 (in the example above) exercises her special power of
appointment over the assets of T3 by means of an instrument that simply
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note 201 and accompanying text.
note 203 and accompanying text.
note 207 and accompanying text.
Part IV.6.2.
Part IV.6.3.
text accompanying note 208.
note 159 and accompanying text.
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incorporates by reference all of the terms of an attached copy of the
Distribution Trust declaration (including the Distribution Trust’s Schedules) and directs that for purposes of T3, a name for T3 should be read
for each occurrence in the attachment of ‘Distribution Trust,’ the name
of B1’s intended beneficiary for each occurrence of the name of the Distribution Trust’s initial Primary Beneficiary, TR3’s name for each occurrence of the name of the Distribution Trust’s initial Trustee, etc.
That would be a case of the exercise of a Derivative Power (B1’s
special power over the assets of T3) to create a Secondary Derivative
Power (TR3’s discretionary distribution power)216 over a new trust administered under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration. It
would also be a case to which Section 6.4 applies. Section 6.4 provides
that any Derivative Power, Secondary Derivative Power, Tertiary Derivative Power, etc. over assets of a trust administered under the provisions
of the Distribution Trust declaration is subject, on the Penultimate
Date217 (assuming the trust in question is still being administered on
that Date), to the provisions of Article V. Article V’s direct application
to powers of appointment is in Section 5.4, which terminates, in the last
discernable moment of the Penultimate Date, any special power over
assets that are then being administered under the Distribution Trust
declaration.218 So, in our last example, TR3’s discretionary distribution
power has to be exercised, if at all, on or before the last discernable
moment of the Penultimate Date219 because, by hypothesis, the assets
subject to TR3’s distribution power (the assets of T3) are subject to the
provisions of Section 5.4 (of the T3 trust instrument).
Of course, the requirement of Article VI of the Distribution Trust
that TR3’s special power of appointment has to be exercised, if at all, on
or before a specified date that qualifies as a Vesting Date within the
meaning of Section 6.1220 will be satisfied in our example: since the relevant lives included on the Schedule B attached to the Distribution Trust
declaration are all lives that were in existence when the Children’s Trust
became irrevocable,221 the Ultimate Date specified in Article V by reference to that Schedule is bound to qualify as a ‘Vesting Date’ within
the meaning of Section 6.1.222 The requirement of Section 6.4 merely
coordinates the Article VI requirement for the period of exercise of a
Derivative Power, Secondary Derivative Power, etc. with the lapse-of216
217
218
219
220
221
222

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

note 207 and accompanying text.
note 129 and accompanying text.
note 129 and accompanying text.
Part IV.6.4; see also supra Part IV.5.4.
note 203 and accompanying text.
Part IV.5.1.
notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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power provision of Section 5.4 for the special situation in which such a
power governs assets of a trust that is subject to Article V on the Penultimate Date.
That situation can arise in various ways. The example we just gave
involves a complete incorporation of the Distribution Trust’s terms into
the instrument governing a new trust created by the exercise of a Derivative Power. But a Subject Power, Derivative Power, Secondary Derivative Power, etc. that can be exercised to appoint assets in trust can be
exercised in favor of an existing trust as well as a new one.223 Suppose,
for example, that Trustee grants a special power of appointment to PB,
the Primary Beneficiary of a trust that is being administered under the
provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration and whose express terms
do not themselves provide PB a power of appointment. That would be a
case of the exercise of a Subject Power (Trustee’s discretionary distribution power)224 to create a Derivative Power over assets of a trust administered under the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration, and
Section 6.4 would apply. Thus, PB’s special power of appointment
would have to be exercised, if at all, on or before the last discernable
moment of the Penultimate Date.225
Another example would be if (1) Bn/2 (in our earlier example
above) in addition to being a permissible distributee of Tn-1, happens to
be a beneficiary of an existing trust Tn that is being administered under
the provisions of the Distribution Trust declaration and whose express
terms provide Bn/2 a special power of appointment, and (2) TRn-1 effectively decants Tn-1 into Tn. Now, to the extent an exercise of a power of
appointment p2 newly subjects assets to a preexisting power of appointment p1, p1 has been created, for purposes of state law,226 federal taxation,227 and Article VI of the Distribution Trust declaration,228 by the
exercise of p2. Thus, when TRn-1 decants the assets of Tn-1 into Tn,
thereby subjecting those assets to Bn/2’s power of appointment, Bn/2’s
power over the newly contributed assets of Tn-1 is created (for all of the
purposes just mentioned) by the decanting exercise of TRn-1’s discretionary distribution power.
223 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.115a(1) (2015) (codifying common law decanting power as a power to distribute assets from one trust to another).
224 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.93(3) (PPTPA anti-Trap exception for case in
which a nonfiduciary special power of appointment over personal property held in trust is
exercised to subject property to, or to create, another nonfiduciary power of appointment
other than a presently exercisable general power).
227 See, e.g., Spica, supra note 152, at 178.
228 See supra Part IV.6.2.
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The confluence of that analysis and our assumption that TRn-1’s decanting of Tn-1 into Tn effectively gives Bn/2 a special power of appointment over the newly contributed assets of Tn-1 is that by virtue of Section
6.4, Bn/2’s special power of appointment has to be exercised, if at all, on
or before the last discernable moment of the Penultimate Date.229 We
should note, however, that in this case, Section 6.4 and the other requirements of Article VI are met even if the instrument exercising TRn1’s discretionary distribution power says no more than:
I, [TRn-1], hereby exercise the discretionary distribution power
described in Section [such and such] of the [Tn-1] trust instrument by appointing all of the assets of [Tn-1] to the trustee(s) of
[Tn], in trust, to be administered and distributed in accordance
with the provisions of the [Tn] trust instrument.
In that case, any interest in the assets of Tn-1 “created” by the exercise of TRn-1’s special power of appointment (that is, by the decanting of
Tn-1 into Tn) must vest or fail no later than a specified date that qualifies
as a Vesting Date within the meaning of Section 6.1, because those assets have become part of Tn, which, by hypothesis, is subject to Article V
of the Distribution Trust declaration,230 and, again, the Ultimate Date
specified in Article V is bound to qualify as a Vesting Date within the
meaning of Section 6.1.231 Any interest created by the exercise of Bn/2’s
special power of appointment must vest or fail no later than a specified
date that qualifies as a Vesting Date within the meaning of Section
6.1,232 because, by hypothesis, Bn/2’s special power is already subject to
Article VI of the Distribution Trust declaration. For the same reason, Bn/
2’s special power itself must be exercised, if at all, no later than a specified date that qualifies as a Vesting Date within the meaning of Section
6.1.233 And in order to be effective in creating any power of appointment other than a presently exercisable general power, an instrument
exercising Bn/2’s special power must subject the created power to the
Derivative Powers requirements of Article VI.234
Thus, all of the substantive requirements imposed on TRn-1’s discretionary distribution power by the transitivity of Article VI’s application
through the series T2, T3, T4, . . . Tn-1 are met if TRn-1 decants Tn-1 into Tn
by means of the one-sentence declaration hypothesized above. And that
declaration satisfies the formal requirements of Article VI as well, for
Section 6.5 provides that an instrument exercising a power of appoint229
230
231
232
233
234
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note 219 and accompanying
Part IV.5.1-5.3.
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ment to create or subject property to another power need not reproduce
or expressly advert to Article VI’s vesting and exercise requirements.
“As long as the instrument’s express provisions entail that any effective
exercise of the created or availed of power will necessarily comply with
all of [Article VI’s] vesting and exercise requirements, it is irrelevant
whether the instrument expressly refers to those requirements or sets
them out.”235
VI. ADAPTING

THE

PROVISIONS

FOR

OTHER CONTEXTS

A. Nonfiduciary Special Powers of Appointment
The Regulatory RAP testing period runs from ostensibly different
dates for purposes of determining the effects (on grandfathered status)
of exercises of fiduciary special powers of appointment, on the one
hand, and of nonfiduciary special powers, on the other. Whereas the
testing period for determining the effect of the exercise of a trustee’s
discretionary distribution power runs from the date the grandfathered
trust in question became irrevocable,236 the testing period for determining the effect of an exercise of a nonfiduciary special power of appointment runs from the date the grandfathered trust was created.237 As
applied to many trusts, these will be two different descriptions of the
same date. But as applied to a trust that was revocable for a period
before the settlor’s death, for instance, the different descriptions raise
the interpretive question whether their difference is supposed to be
significant.
The difference is probably due merely to the vagaries of federal
rulemaking. The two regulations were proposed at different times.
When the regulation regarding nonfiduciary special powers was proposed in 1992,238 the usual request for comments during the rulemaking
process evidently did not elicit any concern about measuring the testing
period “from the date of creation of the trust.”239 So, that provision was
unchanged when the regulation was finalized in 1995.240 But when the
regulation regarding fiduciary special powers was proposed, in 1999,241
the same language drew public comments indicating that the Regulatory
RAP testing period should be measured from the date the trust became
235
236
237
238

Supra Part IV.6.5.
See Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2).
See id. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(B)(2).
See 57 Fed. Reg. 61356 (proposed Dec. 24, 1992) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 26 and

301).
239
240
241

See T.D. 8644, 1996-1 C.B. 200 (final regulations with preamble).
See id.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 62997 (proposed Nov. 18, 1999) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt 26).
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irrevocable.242 The fiduciary powers regulation was revised accordingly,243 but the Treasury did not revisit the counterpart regulation pertaining to nonfiduciary powers.244
It seems clear (1) that there is no principled basis for treating fiduciary and nonfiduciary special powers of appointment differently for this
purpose245 and (2) that for state law purposes, the period during which
the vesting of future interests in the assets of a trust can be postponed
by the exercise of a power of appointment begins when the trust in question becomes irrevocable,246 not when the trust instrument begins to
govern a res.247 So, the regulation pertaining to fiduciary special powers
would seem to provide the better rule. And there may be some recognition of this in the many private letter rulings involving nonfiduciary special powers of appointment in which the Service speaks of the testing
period as running from the date on which the grandfathered trust in
question became irrevocable (albeit without distinguishing the date of
the trust’s creation).248
Still, the point of the decision to play safe with GST-exemptionsheltered assets is to play safe: if we are to posit a hypothetical holder of
a nonfiduciary special power of appointment over the Exempt Portion,
we must assume that she is as risk-averse as our hypothetical trustee of
the Junior Transferor Trust. Her risk-aversion suggests that for purposes
of “protectively” forcing vesting, she would likely plump for the date on
which the Children’s Trust was created in any case in which that date is
earlier than the date on which the Children’s Trust became irrevocable—the date of the Trust’s creation is, after all, the date from which the
applicable Treasury regulation249 says the Regulatory RAP testing period runs. In that case, our hypothetical holder of a nonfiduciary special
242

See T.D. 8912, 2001-1 C.B. 452.
“The comments noted that the perpetuities period is properly measured from the
date the trust became irrevocable, which is not always the date the trust was created (the
date referenced in the proposed regulations). The regulations have been revised accordingly.” Id. at 453.
244 See supra note 237.
245 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (trustee’s discretionary distribution
power is a special power of appointment).
246 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.125 (2015).
247 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 107, § 524.1; MAUDSLEY, supra note 97, at 38.
248 See PLR 200242033 (Jul 19, 2002) (exercises of both fiduciary and nonfiduciary
powers found to be unoffending under the Regulatory RAP where single measuring life
was born after the grandfathered trust was created but before that trust became irrevocable); see also PLR 200242034 (July 19, 2002); PLR 200242031 (July 19, 2002); PLR
200252069 (Sept. 12, 2002); PLR 200024019 (Mar 13, 2000); PLR 9511039 (Dec. 20, 1994);
PLR 9414024 (Jan. 6, 1994).
249 I.e., Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(B)(2). See supra text accompanying note
237.
243
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power of appointment over the Exempt Portion will make sure that the
Ultimate Date in Section 5.1 and the Vesting Date in Section 6.1250 of
the forced-vesting provisions are both specified by reference to the date
on which the Children’s Trust was created, rather than the date of the
Trust’s irrevocability. Otherwise, her use of the forced-vesting provisions will be the same as that of a decanting trustee.
B. Exercising Powers over GST Tax Grandfathered Assets
The trustee’s “playing safe” with GST-exemption-sheltered assets
as described in Parts IV and V of the Article consists merely in her
pretending that the Exempt Portion of the Junior Transferor Trust is
grandfathered under the GST tax effective date regulations and then
being careful not to forfeit that (imagined) status when decanting. If the
Children’s Trust had been irrevocable on September 25, 1985 and, therefore, actually grandfathered,251 the trustee of the Transferor Trust would
do nothing differently except dispense with the make-believe. In that
case, Section 1.3 of the hypothetical Distribution Trust declaration252
would read
1.3 This Declaration is intended to ensure, among other
things, that the vesting and exercise requirements of Treasury
regulation section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(A)(2) (“Regulatory
RAP”) are observed as fully as is necessary to preserve the
Trust assets’ exemption from federal generation-skipping
transfer tax in light of the Children’s Trust’s having been irrevocable on September 25, 1985. The settlor [of the Distribution
Trust, viz., the trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust] intends
that all interests in the Distribution Trust and all powers of appointment over the Distribution Trust’s assets shall be so constrained by the provisions of this Declaration as fully to comply
with the vesting and exercise requirements of the Regulatory
RAP.
It is true (1) that grandfathered assets are not subject to PPTPA,253
which means decanting (or, for that matter, the exercise of a nonfiduciary special power to appoint in trust) does not pose the same threat,
under Michigan law, to mandated compliance with the Regulatory RAP
that decanting (or another appointment in trust) of GST-exemptionsheltered assets poses to feigned compliance (for purposes of playing
250

See supra Part IV.5.1, 6.1.
See supra note 5.
252 See supra Part IV.1.3.
253 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.94 (2015); see also supra text accompanying note 34;
see generally Spica, supra note 7, at 1372, 1375-76.
251
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safe);254 and (2) that as to grandfathered assets, the threat to mandated
compliance with the Regulatory RAP posed, under the USRAP, by certain later-of-two-events vesting provisions255 is disarmed by Michigan’s
version of USRAP section 1(e).256 But the possibility of a change of
governing law257 and the virtue of perspicuity both recommend the use
of forced-vesting provisions in this context, the benignity of Michigan’s
USRAP notwithstanding.
C. Avoiding the Delaware Tax Trap
As noted above, the Trap provides that assets subject to a power of
appointment (first power) are included in the power holder’s (H’s)
transfer tax base (gift tax base or gross estate depending on whether the
triggering exercise is effectively testamentary) to the extent H exercises
the power by creating a second power (over the assets in question) that
“under the applicable local law can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of [future interests in the assets], or suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of such [assets], for a period
ascertainable without regard to the date of creation of the first
power.”258 Thus, the tax rule against perpetuities imposed by the Trap is
not the Regulatory RAP, but rather the requirement that however long
the perpetuities testing period made relevant by local law or the governing instrument may be,259 that period must be measured, if the Trap
254
255
256

See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text
See supra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.72(5); see also supra text accompanying notes 192-

93.
257

See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2.
259 Though it is tangential to the topic of forced vesting, it is interesting to note that
an interpretive question raised by both the Regulatory RAP and the Trap has been answered regarding the Trap. Whereas the Regulatory RAP and the Trap both refer to
postponement of vesting and suspension of absolute ownership or the power of alienation in the disjunctive (see supra text accompanying note 2), in the case of the Trap, the
disjunction has been interpreted as a reference to the particular vesting or alienation
requirements imposed by local law. See Estate of Murphy v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 671 (1979),
acq. 1979-2 C.B. 2; see also Greer, supra note 1, at 71-72.
So, in a jurisdiction that has a rule against suspension of absolute ownership or the
power of alienation, but not a RAP, the Trap is sprung (that is, causes inclusion in the
relevant transfer tax base) only if under the applicable local law, the period during which
absolute ownership or the power of alienation may be suspended by exercise of the second power can be ascertained without regard to the date of the first power’s creation.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-32 (2015). And in a jurisdiction that has a RAP, but not a
rule against suspension of absolute ownership or the power of alienation, the Trap is
sprung only if the period during which vesting may be postponed by exercise of the second power can be ascertained without regard to the date of the first power’s creation.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.93(3) (2015) (Michigan’s post-USRAP perpetuities
258
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is not to be sprung, from the time the first power is created. This entails
that the relevant period must be finite, but the period’s duration is literally indifferent under the Trap.260
As we have also noted, legislative history indicates that the Trap
was not intended to apply to exercises of fiduciary powers of appointment.261 That means the Trap does not apply when the trustee of the
Junior Transferor Trust creates the Distribution Trust. And it means we
cannot use a decanting situation to motivate use of the forced-vesting
provisions (in Part IV of the Article) for Trap avoidance. To motivate
that use of the provisions, we have to imagine a nonfiduciary special
power like the ones held by B1, B2, B3, . . . Bn/2 in the hypothetical case
described above (in Part V) apropos of Section 6.3.262 Let us, therefore,
return to that hypothetical chain of events and focus on the link in which
B1 exercises her special power of appointment over the assets of trust T2
by creating a new trust T3 and effectively granting the trustee of T3, TR3,
a fully discretionary distribution power.263
In that case, the prima facie condition for the application of the
Trap is met: B1 has exercised her nonfiduciary power of appointment so
as to create another power of appointment, TR3’s discretionary distribution power. It is true that TR3’s power is a fiduciary power, but the assurance we have, in legislative history, that the Trap does not apply to
exercises of fiduciary powers of appointment264 is probably limited to
fiduciary powers of appointment created by transfers in trust that are
not themselves proximately attributable to the exercise of a nonfiduciary
power of appointment; and, in any case, the assurance seems to be only
that the Trap will not cause assets to be included in the fiduciary’s transfer tax base.265 So, it is well to ask whether the Trap will include the
assets of T3 in B1’s transfer tax base if TR3’s discretionary distribution
power is viewed as a “second power” for purposes of the Trap.
The answer is that it will not, because for purposes of determining
the period during which the vesting of future interests can be postponed
by an exercise of B1’s special power: B1’s power is deemed to have been
created when the special power that created it, Trustee’s discretionary
distribution power, was created; Trustee’s discretionary distribution
power is deemed to have been created when the power that created it,
reform statute’s anti-Trap provision). As to the distinction between a RAP and a rule
against suspension of absolute ownership or the power of alienation, see, e.g., Spica,
supra note 7, at 1355-56.
260 See Spica, supra note 1, at 680-82.
261 See supra note 156.
262 See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
264 See supra note 156.
265 See Spica, supra note 14, at 79-80.
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the discretionary distribution power of the trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust, was created;266 the discretionary distribution power of the
trustee of the Junior Transferor Trust is deemed to have been created
when the Children’s Trust became irrevocable (assuming, again, that the
Children’s Trust was not itself created by the exercise of a testamentary
general or special power of appointment);267 and the date of the Children’s Trust’s irrevocability is the qualifying date for any measuring life
that may affect the Vesting Date described in Article VI of the forcedvesting provisions.268
It follows from the assumption that B1’s creation of TR3’s Secondary Derivative Power over the assets of T3 is effective that the instrument exercising B1’s Derivative Power over the assets of T2 had to
subject TR3’s Secondary Derivative Power to all of the Derivative Powers requirements of Article VI of the forced-vesting provisions,269 which
means that an exercise of TR3’s power cannot violate the Regulatory
RAP.270 Since (1) compliance with the Regulatory RAP requires any
interest created by TR3’s power to vest within a finite period measured
from the date the Children’s Trust became irrevocable271 and (2) B1’s
special power is deemed to have been created on the date the Children’s
Trust became irrevocable (assuming that the Children’s Trust was not
itself created by the exercise of a testamentary general or special power
of appointment),272 TR3’s power cannot “be validly exercised so as to
postpone the vesting of [future interests in the assets of T3] . . . for a
period ascertainable without regard to the date of creation of [B1‘s]
power.”273 Thus, the Trap is not sprung when B1 creates T3.274
Of course, if we assume, for a change, that the assets of T2 are
neither GST tax grandfathered nor GST exemption sheltered, B1 has no
motivation to comply with the Regulatory RAP. Her motivation, in that
case, assuming she wishes to avoid the Trap, is merely to ensure that
future interests created by exercises of TR3’s discretionary distribution
power (or any other special power of appointment created by exercise
of B1’s special power) must vest within a finite period measured from
the deemed creation of B1’s special power,275 that is, from the date on
266

See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 556.124(1) (2015).
See id. § 556.125.
268 See supra Part IV.6.1.
269 See supra Part IV.6.3; see also supra text accompanying notes 209-13.
270 See supra Part IV.6.3; see also supra text accompanying notes 209-13.
271 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
273 I.R.C. § 2041(a)(3) (estate tax version of Trap); see also id. § 2514(d) (gift tax
version).
274 See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 258-260 and accompanying text.
267
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which the Children’s Trust became irrevocable (assuming the Children’s
Trust was not itself created by the exercise of a testamentary general or
special power of appointment).276
As we have seen, the assumption that Michigan law governs B1’s
power entails that to the extent T3 comprises personal property,
PPTPA’s anti-Trap provision automatically prevents an exercise of B1’s
power from springing the Trap unless the exercise creates a presently
exercisable general power of appointment.277 But in the case in which
the assets of T2 are neither GST tax grandfathered nor GST exemption
sheltered, if the law of a state other than Michigan governs B1’s power,
or if B1 considers that the possibility of a change of governing law or the
virtue of perspicuity warrants use of forced-vesting provisions,278 she
can adapt the provisions in Part IV of the Article by simply defining the
Ultimate Date279 and the Vesting Date280 as a specified anniversary of
the date on which the Children’s Trust became irrevocable.
The three-hundredth anniversary, for example, would do. In that
case, any future interest created by the exercise of TR3’s discretionary
distribution power will have to vest by the date in 2307 that is threehundred years from the date on which the Children’s Trust became irrevocable. Since the date of the Children’s Trust’s irrevocability is the
date on which B1’s special power is deemed to have been created (assuming the Children’s Trust was not itself created by the exercise of a
testamentary general or special power of appointment),281 the terminus
of the period during which vesting can be postponed by an exercise of
TR3’s power (viz., the three-hundredth anniversary of the Children’s
Trust’s irrevocability) cannot be determined without regard to the date
of creation of B1’s special power. And so, again, the Trap is not sprung
when B1 creates T3.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have motivated and elucidated the forced-vesting provisions set
out in Part IV of this Article primarily in the context of the third and
most general of the three planning situations with which we began, the
GST Exemption Situation, in which the holder of a special power of
appointment—we treated first of a fiduciary power and then, in Part VI,
276

See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. The result is exactly the same
under Michigan law, though the analysis is different, to the extent T3 comprises realty.
See Spica, supra note 1, at 679-81.
278 See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
279 See supra Part IV.5.1.
280 See supra Part IV.6.1.
281 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
277
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of a nonfiduciary one—wants to play safe with assets of a pre-perpetuities-reform trust to which GST exemption has been allocated in a jurisdiction in which, apart from any exclusion for GST tax grandfathered
assets, it is possible to appoint into the reformed perpetuities regime.282
But we have seen that the same provisions can be adapted for use in the
Grandfathered Assets Situation, when a special power is being exercised
over GST tax grandfathered assets in a jurisdiction whose perpetuities
reform does not expressly exclude such assets, and in the Trap Situation,
when a nonfiduciary special power (first power) is being exercised to
create, or newly subject property to, another power of appointment
(second power)283 in a jurisdiction whose perpetuities reform creates a
need for, but does not provide, an anti-Trap provision.
The risk that the forced-vesting provisions disarm in the GST Exemption Situation and the Grandfathered Assets Situation is that local
perpetuities reform will have made the period during which the vesting
of future interests can be postponed by the exercise of a (fiduciary or
nonfiduciary) special power of appointment longer than the Regulatory
RAP testing period. The risk that the forced-vesting provisions disarm
in the Trap Situation is that perpetuities reform will have made the period during which vesting can be postponed by an exercise of a second
power infinite (or will otherwise have made the precise vintage of the
first power irrelevant to the time for the vesting of future interests created by excise of the second).

282
283

See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
See supra note 2.
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APPENDIX A: QUALIFIED SEVERANCE
The question relegated to this appendix is whether the isolation of
the Exempt Portion of the Junior Transferor Trust, so as to create a separate trust having a GST tax inclusion ratio of zero, must either precede,
rather than follow, or follow, rather than precede, the intended decanting.284 Must the order be “qualified severance” of the Exempt Portion followed by a decanting of the resulting isolation trust (GSTT
Exempt Junior Transferor Trust) into the Distribution Trust? Must the
order be the reverse, decanting the Junior Transferor Trust into the Distribution Trust followed by a qualified severance of the Exempt Portion
from the Distribution Trust?
By hypothesis, the GST-exemption-sheltered status of a trust having an inclusion ratio of zero will survive a decanting in circumstances in
which grandfathered status would survive if the decanted trust were
grandfathered from GST tax, and the trustee is in a position to decant
either the Exempt Portion or the entire Junior Transferor Trust in such a
way that GST-tax-grandfathered status would survive if the Junior
Transferor Trust were grandfathered.285 So, as far as the posited analogy
to the effective date regulations286 is concerned, a decanting that would
preserve the zero inclusion ratio of the GSTT Exempt Junior Transferor
Trust could take place after a qualified severance of the Junior Transferor Trust. The question, then, is only whether the qualified severance
rules require either that the decanting precede the qualified severance
or that the qualified severances precede the decanting.
The one provision of the qualified severance rules that might seem
clearly to indicate the decanting-first-then-severance order (that is, that
decanting must precede a qualified severance) has to do with the time
for making a qualified severance:
A qualified severance of a trust may occur at any time prior to
the termination of the trust. Thus, provided that the separate
resulting trusts continue in existence after the severance, a qualified severance may occur either before or after . . . GST tax
[sic] exemption has been allocated to the trust.287
If it were a condition of qualified severance that the trusts immediately
resulting from the severance had to “continue in existence,” then the
284

See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
notes 48-54.
286 I.e., the notion that what is said in the effective date regulations about
grandfathered trusts may also pertain to the treatment of a trust having a zero inclusion
ratio. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
287 Treas. Reg. § 26.2642-6(f)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
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Junior Transferor Trust would have to be decanted into the Distribution
Trust first—before the Exempt Portion could be isolated by severance—
because, on the alternative severance-first-then-decanting tack, decanting the GSTT Exempt Junior Transferor Trust would be a matter
(under Michigan law) of terminating that trust by distributing all of its
assets to a new Distribution Trust.288
It does not seem reasonable, however, to interpret the language
quoted above (When Regulation) as making the continued existence of
the resulting trusts a condition of qualified severance. If resulting trusts
had to “continue in existence after the severance” indefinitely, the qualified severance rules would apply only to so-called “dynasty trusts,” a
restriction of which there is no hint in the Code.289 And the When Regulation does not attempt to specify any more definite period for continuance: it does not say, for example, “continue in existence for a
considerable time.” So, the second sentence of the When Regulation is
probably best interpreted as merely enforcing the requirement of the
first sentence, that a qualified severance cannot be made after a trust
has terminated—there have to be trusts in existence that are affected by
a qualified severance after that qualified severance is done. That the
second sentence begins with the adverb ‘thus’ tends to support this interpretation, on which the When Regulation is not inconsistent with the
alternative severance-first-then-decanting tack.
And, indeed, the following provision of the qualified severance
rules may seem to indicate that the decanting should follow the qualified
severance:
In the case of a qualified severance occurring after GST tax
[sic] exemption has been allocated to the trust (whether by an
affirmative allocation, a deemed allocation, or an automatic allocation pursuant to the rules contained in section 2632), if the
trust has an inclusion ratio as defined in § 26.2642-1 that is
greater than zero and less than one, then . . . [t]he trust [under
the first of two alternatives, must be] severed initially into only
two resulting trusts. One resulting trust must receive that fractional share of the total value of the original trust as of the date
of severance . . . .290
It seems clear that the references in this provision (Which-Trust Regulation) to “the trust” and “the original trust” are references to one and the
288

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 2642(a)(3).
290 Treas. Reg. § 26.2642-6(d)(7)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). See also id. § 26.2642-6(d)
(7) (iii) (alternative requirements in case “original trust” is severed initially into more
than two resulting trusts).
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same trust and that that trust is both the trust to be severed and the trust
to which at least part of the GST exemption was previously allocated.
The Junior Transferor Trust fits the latter description, but the Distribution Trust would not. The automatic allocation of GST exemption
on Junior’s death was to the Junior Portion of the Sibling Trust.291 When
the Junior Portion of the Sibling Trust was actually divided to form a
separate Junior Transferor Trust (pursuant to state law,292 as sanctioned
by the Treasury regulations under Code section 2654293), the division
was along a line already recognized for GST tax purposes under the
Treasury regulations.294 So, for GST tax purposes, the Junior Transferor
Trust is identified with the Junior Portion of the Sibling Trust.295 This
means that for GST tax purposes, the Junior Transferor Trust is the trust
to which GST exemption was automatically allocated at the time of Junior’s death.
But, again, the Distribution Trust will necessarily be distinct from
the Junior Transferor Trust when the former is created by decanting the
latter.296 So, on the decanting-first-then-severance tack, the Distribution
Trust created at the first step (that is, the decanting) cannot accurately
be described as the trust to which GST exemption was previously allocated for purposes of the Which-Trust Regulation. Furthermore, on the
decanting-first-then-severance tack, the trust to which the Which-Trust
Regulation arguably refers (the Junior Transferor Trust) will have been
terminated at the first step,297 which brings the decanting-first-then-severance tack under the prohibition of the When Regulation as interpreted above—again, a qualified severance cannot be made after the
“original trust” has terminated,298 and the trust arguably picked out by
the Which-Trust Regulation as “original” for this purpose—(the Junior
Transferor Trust) will have been emptied by decanting.
In conclusion, then, the most plausible readings of the When and
Which-Trust Regulations seem to indicate that if the GSTT Exempt Junior Transferor Trust is severed from the Junior Transferor Trust before
the Exempt Transferor Trust is decanted into a Distribution Trust, the
severance may constitute a qualified severance for GST tax purposes
and the Distribution Trust containing the Exempt Portion may, there291

See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
293 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2654-1(a)(3) (“may be divided at any time”).
294 See id. § 26.2654-1(a)(2); see also supra text accompanying note 30.
295 N.b., the posited identification assumes that the funding of the Junior Transferor
Trust was consistent with the applicable Treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 26.26541(a)(3), (b)(1)(ii)(C).
296 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
298 See supra note 287.
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fore, have a GST tax inclusion ratio of zero. Those regulations perhaps
also indicate that if the Junior Transferor Trust is decanted into the Distribution Trust before the Exempt Portion is isolated by severance, that
severance, when it occurs, will not constitute a qualified severance, in
which case each of the resulting, post-severance trusts will have the
same, blended inclusion ratio with which the Distribution Trust (on this
decanting-first-then-severance tack) will have begun.299 So, the Treasury
regulations arguably endorse the severance-first-then-decanting tack
uniquely.

299 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2642-6(h) (treatment of trusts resulting from a severance that
is not a qualified severance).

Fall/Winter 2014]

MEANS TO AN END

405

APPENDIX B: THE DELAWARE TAX TRAP AND SPRINGING PRESENTLY
EXERCISABLE GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
The question relegated to this appendix is why automatic creation
of a presently exercisable general power of appointment over the assets
subject to Section 5.2 of the forced-vesting provisions could cause a
problem under the Trap if someone were to exercise a nonfiduciary special power of appointment so as to subject assets to the provisions of the
Distribution Trust.300 To answer that question, we have only to draw
together three threads already woven into the fabric of the main argument of the Article.
The first thread is that of the Trap itself: assets subject to a power of
appointment (first power) are included in the power holder’s (H’s)
transfer tax base (gift tax base or gross estate depending on whether the
triggering exercise is effectively testamentary) to the extent H exercises
the power by creating a second power (over the assets in question) that
“under the applicable local law can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of [future interests in the assets], or suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of such [assets], for a period
ascertainable without regard to the date of creation of the first
power.”301 The second thread is that the exercise of a special power of
appointment that is subject to Michigan law so as to create a presently
exercisable general power of appointment will spring the Trap.302 And
the third thread is that to the extent an exercise of a power of appointment p2 newly subjects assets to a preexisting power of appointment p1,
p1 has been created, for purposes of state law and federal taxation, by
the exercise of p2.303 (It will be convenient for us to tag this third thread
“Subjection-Creation Principle.”)
Let us suppose, then, that instead of forcing vesting (as it does) by
transfer of possession, Section 5.2 of the forced-vesting provisions of the
Distribution Trust declaration simply provides the “Primary Beneficiary” of the separate trust in question a presently exercisable general
power of appointment over the affected assets.304 Let us suppose too
that B1 in the hypothetical case described above apropos of Section 6.3
of the forced-vesting provisions,305 exercises her nonfiduciary special
power of appointment over the assets of T3 by means of an instrument
that simply appoints those assets, in trust, to the trustee of an existing
300
301
302
303
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See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
See supra note 2.
See supra notes 151-54, 277 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
Cf. supra Part IV.5.2.
See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
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trust that is being administered under the provisions of the Distribution
Trust for the benefit of a certain Primary Beneficiary PB.
The problem, in that case, is that although the presently exercisable
general power granted PB or a remoter beneficiary by Section 5.2 (on
our latest assumptions) would not become effective until the Ultimate
Date, an application of the Subjection-Creation Principle as of the time
of the exercise of B1’s special power would make the (newly hypothesized) springing Section 5.2 presently exercisable general power a “second power” for purposes of the Trap, one that “under the applicable
local law can be validly exercised [once it becomes effective] so as to
postpone the vesting of [future interests in the assets added from T3 by
the exercise of B1’s power] . . . for a period ascertainable without regard
to the date of creation of [B1’s] power.”306 On that construction, B1’s
“creation” of the springing Section 5.2 presently exercisable general
power would spring the Trap, and the assets of T3 would be included in
B1’s transfer tax base.
That is why Section 5.2 of the forced-vesting provisions eschews
springing presently exercisable general powers of appointment in favor
of a combination of mandatory distributions (pursuant to Section 5.2
itself) and springing vested interests (pursuant to Section 5.3).307
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See supra text accompanying notes 301-03.
See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.

